On Thu, Nov 05, 2015 at 12:22:00PM +0100, Petr Cech wrote:
On 10/21/2015 03:19 PM, Petr Cech wrote:
>On 10/12/2015 11:37 AM, Jakub Hrozek wrote:
>>>> From a15acee2495ee12190e711f3344e14c54fc73062 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>>>From: Petr Cech<pcech(a)redhat.com>
>>>>Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2015 08:57:15 -0400
>>>>Subject: [PATCH 10/11] KRB5_CHILD: More restrictive umask
>>>>
>>>>We could use more restrictive umask in krb5_child. I found out that
>>>>there is directory creation, but it is done by create_ccache_dir()
>>>>which has its own umask setup.
>>>>
>>>>Resolves:
>>>>https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2424
>>>>---
>>>> src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 2 +-
>>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>>
>>>>diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
>>>b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
>>>>index
>>>69b7687188c04498f6ef7c10a1b5ca602daca8ef..be8db23df4660adcb59fcd2677b28ee415cd18d8
>>>100644
>>>>--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
>>>>+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
>>>>@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static krb5_error_code create_ccache(char
>>>*ccname, krb5_creds *creds)
>>>> #endif
>>>>
>>>> /* Set a restrictive umask, just in case we end up creating
>>>any file */
>>>>- umask(SSS_DFL_X_UMASK);
>>>>+ umask(SSS_DFL_UMASK);
>>I think this change is OK, as you say, the directories might need the
>>executable flag, but then the directory-creating code should make sure
>>the permissions are more relaxed..
>I checked it again. It is OK.
>
>>
>>btw I tested both FILE ccache:
>> krb5_ccname_template =FILE:/tmp/ccache_%p.XXXXXX
>>the result looked OK to me:
>> # ll /tmp/ccache_admin(a)IPA.TEST.KDaxgn
>> -rw-------. 1 admin admins 1041 Oct 12 09:14
>>/tmp/ccache_admin(a)IPA.TEST.KDaxgn
>>and DIR ccache:
>> krb5_ccname_template = DIR:/tmp/ccaches/ccache_%p
>>also looked good:
>> # ll -d/tmp/ccaches/
>> drwx------. 3 admin admins 4096 Oct 12 09:31/tmp/ccaches/
>> # ll -d/tmp/ccaches/ccache_admin(a)IPA.TEST/
>> drwx------. 2 admin admins 4096 Oct 12
>>09:31/tmp/ccaches/ccache_admin@IPA.TEST/
>> # ll /tmp/ccaches/ccache_admin(a)IPA.TEST
>> -rw-------. 1 admin admins 10 Oct 12 09:31 primary
>> -rw-------. 1 admin admins 1041 Oct 12 09:31 tktrg2WYD
>>
>>>>
>>>> /* we create a new context here as the main process one may
>>>have been
>>>> * opened as root and contain possibly references (even open
>>>handles ?)
>>>>--
>>>>2.4.3
>>>>
>>>> From 6085c5ce86e6ba79f29d2c18f6fceca9bab5cecb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>>>>From: Petr Cech<pcech(a)redhat.com>
>>>>Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2015 09:32:12 -0400
>>>>Subject: [PATCH 11/11] UTILS: Removing SSS_DFL_X UMASK constant
>>077 is still used in sss_unique_file(). So we can either use SSS_DFL_X
>>umask there or convert to non-executable umask. Either way, I think it's
>>OK to keep SSS_DFL_X even though it's unused right now for later use.
>>It's just a constant.
>OK, SSS_DFL_X_UMASK is still here, but not used in code.
>
>>
>>sss_unique_file is used to generate kdcinfo files, where non-x would be
>>OK because later we fchmod to 644 anyway:
>> ret = fchmod(fd, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH);
>>
>>..and also used in gpo_cache_store_file() which uses the same pattern..
>>
>I rewrote DFL_X to DFL in sss_unique_file().
>
>>...then also in sss_unique_filename() which is used to create dummy
>>keytabs in ipa_server_trusted_dom_setup_1way(), handle_randomized() and
>>ldap_child_get_tgt_sync(). Now:
>> - ipa_server_trusted_dom_setup_1way() - safe to change, we only
>>use it
>> to get a unique filename, the contents are filled with ipa-getkeytab
>> - handle_randomized() - safe to change, libkrb5 unlinks the unique
>> file later, so we just really need the filename
>> - ldap_child_get_tgt_sync() - ditto, only used as input for
>> krb5_cc_resolve()
>
>The third patch is about redudant constant.
>
>And at the end, there are may uses of umask() in CI tests, which I leave
>how they are. They could be test relevant. Maybe I will touch it in some
>future patch.
>
>The last umask like constant is 644, which is connected to chmod(),
>open(), etc. Do we want to have a constant for it?
>
>Regards
>
>Petr
>
>
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bump
I was reviewing the patches this morning :-)
ACK
CI:
http://sssd-ci.duckdns.org/logs/job/32/08/summary.html