On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 4:36 pm, Sheogorath
<sheogorath(a)shivering-isles.com> wrote:
> Doesn't make any sense to me. The reason to get a per-user encryption
> sounds useful in order to reduce the leaking of user data when we have
> multiple users per device. /home only encryption protects whom?
It protects the users from 3rd parties. If POSIX permissions are
inadequate separation between users (and I agree that it could be),
then only encrypting user home directories is also inadequate. There
are ample attack vectors that remain to anyone with physical access.
> An attacker with access to the disk can install malware and put
it in
> auto start. So there is no real protection here. When we encrypt
> `/home`
> we can encrypt the rest as well.
The attacker can just as straightforwardly inject malware into the
initramfs. In the present Anaconda full disk encryption model, which
the encryption subgroup prefers to avoid for various UI/Ux reasons
including limited a11y, i18n functionality, the /boot volume is not
encrypted.
--
Chris Murphy