On Wed, 2007-07-11 at 21:30 +0200, Jeroen van Meeuwen wrote:
A possible solution might be though, to have Transifex store the
submitted PO's in /some/path/transifex, and then have another user
account lift it's files and metadata, commit it to the pulled source
repository (signed with GPG), and then push it upstream (with SSH
priv/pub keys). Storing those passwords (plaintext or decryptable) would
make just as much sense to me as allowing empty passwords to use these
keys, but at least you prevent the webinterface from ever reaching those
keys or files.
Seems like an idea to pursue. If httpd is the user doing the TurboGears
part, then have a transifexd that does the actual commits. That
separation of the Web interface plus a good SELinux policy might be
enough. How to trigger it? Or let it run as a full-time daemon?
The risk, folks, is that we get compromised and someone cracks an
upstream SCM through our servers. Just think about that. Enough to
turn a warm beer cold.
- Karsten
--
Karsten Wade, 108 Editor ^ Fedora Documentation Project
Sr. Developer Relations Mgr. |
fedoraproject.org/wiki/DocsProject
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