Ed Greshko wrote:
>> I think you have no concept of public/private encryption or
signing.
>>
> My concept is that if I can fool you into accepting a false public
> key, I can sign packages with the matching false private key, and when
> you install the first such package it may (probably will) include evil
> things of some nature.
>
> Do you disagree? Or feel that if I can get you to run one evil package
> I can't put in a root kit, or rend personal information from your
> systems, or otherwise attack your system?
>
> If you feel that line of attack is not possible do tell me how your
> concept of encryption and signing prevents it.
>
I thought you were talking "real world" as opposed to purely hypothetical.
I think it is a reasonable real world assumption that some users could
have their DNS compromised in a way that would make them pull packages
from somewhere other than the official repositories. Can any key trust
scenario where they have to obtain a new key protect against installing
modified packages? (i.e. assume that the fake key and packages come from
the same place(s) pretending to be the official repositories and mirrors).
--
Les Mikesell
lesmikesell(a)gmail.com