Bill Davidsen wrote:
>
> If the public/private key methods employed today are as easy to
> penetrate and subvert as some seem to be claiming then one has to
> question why it hasn't already been done.
>
It has already been proved to be possible, so discussion of how easy
it is or way is irrelevant, at least to me.
??? It has? So, what was done? Was
the signing key of Fedora
compromised? Was a replacement key public key generated and
distributed? Were packages signed by the replacement key distributed?
What was "proven".
The new public key could be distributed from the master Red Hat
servers, not from mirrors, which would allow validation of the content
by the validity of the SSL certificate. Once a trusted signature is
available, all other packages, from mirror or torrent, could be
properly validated.
"Could"...how?
While this is inconvenient, it is also as secure as the original, and
not readily vulnerable to attacks in the distribution, since middlemen
are not involved. And once the key is out for a few days, and many
users have it and can quickly compare it to any other key distributed
by other means, then it can be sent out in a more convenient manner if
people really feel the need to trade some security for ease of use.
A whole bunch of people are wringing their hands over nothing. I
suppose if you want to continue doing that that is your choice.
The strange things is that none of this would have come up if the
servers of Fedora hadn't been penetrated by some method which nobody on
this list is privy to...but can spend endless hours on idle speculation
and fear mongering.
[WOT comment] I suspect that those fear peddlers, if located in the US,
will also be voting for the Republican candidate. :-)
--
Some people's mouths work faster than their brains. They say things they
haven't even thought of yet.