On Tue, 2004-07-06 at 02:18, Russell Coker wrote:
For a really secure system you have to boot from removable or
read-only media.
If an attacker can compromise the kernel image that you boot from then they
can own you. If you have an unencrypted kernel/initrd stored on the hard
disk then you must either keep the hard disk locked up at all times (in which
case encrypting it doesn't gain much) or treat every unexpected reboot as a
potential compromise.
I was concentrating mainly on means to secure data (against prying eyes,
not corruption), securing a system is a completely different kind of
thing. And I know that for my data to be really secure against an
attacker, my kernel must be secure, too. But let's reach for the
lower-hanging branches first, okay? ;-)
Nils
--
Nils Philippsen / Red Hat / nphilipp(a)redhat.com
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- B. Franklin, 1759
PGP fingerprint: C4A8 9474 5C4C ADE3 2B8F 656D 47D8 9B65 6951 3011