On Tue, 6 Jul 2004 17:08, Nils Philippsen <nphilipp(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On Tue, 2004-07-06 at 02:18, Russell Coker wrote:
> For a really secure system you have to boot from removable or read-only
> media.
>
> If an attacker can compromise the kernel image that you boot from then
> they can own you. If you have an unencrypted kernel/initrd stored on the
> hard disk then you must either keep the hard disk locked up at all times
> (in which case encrypting it doesn't gain much) or treat every unexpected
> reboot as a potential compromise.
I was concentrating mainly on means to secure data (against prying eyes,
not corruption), securing a system is a completely different kind of
thing.
Securing the system is exactly the same thing IMHO.
If your system is insecure then encryption won't help, the attacker will get
all your passwords and happily decrypt all your data!
And I know that for my data to be really secure against an
attacker, my kernel must be secure, too. But let's reach for the
lower-hanging branches first, okay? ;-)
I agree. Encrypted swap is the lowest branch IMHO.
--
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages
http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark
http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page