Florian Weimer wrote:
On 12/21/2014 05:28 PM, Björn Persson wrote:
> Alternatively, cut out the packet filter and have GlibC ask the user
> whether the call to bind or connect shall be allowed to succeed (or
> automatically allow or deny the call if so configured). This has the
> advantage that the program is informed that it's not allowed to
glibc is the wrong place for this, and a patch in this direction has
absolutely zero chance of being accepted upstream. We also ship
applications which call system calls directly, not through glibc, so
patching glibc would not even work at a technical level.
That's true. The ability to call system calls directly kills the idea of
having GlibC deny the call.
(It does not affect the idea of calling FirewallD from GlibC rather
than from each program individually. Those few programs that do call
system calls directly could still call FirewallD on their own.)
However, a Linux Security Module such as SELinux could audit socket
creation, and provide the user with means to override the default
Yes, that may be an even better solution if there is a way for SElinux
to ask the user.
However, this will be extremely controversial (even more so
than the open firewall) because it will remind people of “personal
firewalls” on Windows.
I bet! I worry that the questions would quickly become annoying. But if
ports are going to be blocked by default, then there needs to be some
way for non-sysadmin users to open them.