On 05/31/2012 01:48 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote:
On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:42 PM, Gerry Reno
<greno(a)verizon.net> wrote:
> On 05/31/2012 01:34 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote:
>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:22 PM, Gerry Reno <greno(a)verizon.net> wrote:
>>> On 05/31/2012 01:19 PM, Jon Ciesla wrote:
>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 12:16 PM, Gerry Reno <greno(a)verizon.net>
wrote:
>>>>> On 05/31/2012 01:10 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
>>>>>> On Thu, May 31, 2012 at 1:07 PM, Gerry Reno
<greno(a)verizon.net> wrote:
>>>>>>> Could be any of a thousand ways to implement this.
>>>>>>> Maybe it checks the BIOS to determine whether some SecureBoot
flag is set.
>>>>>> While it pains me to argue with someone on my side— you're
incorrect.
>>>>>> The compromised system would just intercept and emulate or patch
out that test.
>>>>> Then what's missing here is a way for booted OS's to test
themselves for integrity.
>>>> Maybe some sort of cryptographic signature stored in the hardware?
>>>>
>>>> <ducks>
>>>>
>>>> -J
>>>>
>>>> </sarcasm>
>>>>
>>> Just not dictated by one monopoly.
>> Ideally, no. But you see the problem. I'm divided on the solution
>> myself, but I've yet to see one I feel better about.
>>
>> -J
>>
>>
> This game of cat and mouse with the blackhats is not going to end until we have some
type of read-only partitions where
> known good code resides.
We have that, ISO9660. Known good == known good to whom?
Nah, can't be iso.
Has to be HDD partitions whose ro/rw state is controlled by hardware.