On Tuesday, June 2, 2020 10:52:07 PM MST Chris Murphy wrote:
On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 8:42 PM John M. Harris Jr
<johnmh(a)splentity.com>
wrote:
> In what way is it incompatible with UEFI Secure Boot?
Secure Boot does boot verification. Hibernation right now doesn't. And
that makes it a Secure Boot loophole. And that makes it incompatible
with Secure Boot.
It's not a new idea, it's been this way for a while. And so have the
complaints.
https://lwn.net/Articles/523367/
<If the kernel and
> initramfs are signed, and the resume image is for that kernel, how is this
> an issue?
The initramfs is not signed.
> What if swap is on LUKS?
No signature. No integrity. It is a net reduction in the protection
provided by Secure Boot - e.g. it can't detect intentional corruption
that could crash the system or even cause more corruption and eventual
data loss as the system runs.
> If kernel lockdown is what disables this, we should look at fixing kernel
> lockdown so that it doesn't break hibernation. This is definitely a
> security decision that we shouldn't be imposing on the masses
> needlessly, in my opinion.
Instead you propose imposing a loophole for attackers to easily deploy
malware needlessly. Do you really not see how this is an untenable
position for Fedora?
In my opinion, the threat model you're proposing here is absurd. If people can
create a valid kernel image that will be loaded from a LUKS container, we have
bigger problems.
--
John M. Harris, Jr.