Am 03.06.20 um 07:27 schrieb Chris Murphy:
You trust the encryption only to provide confidentiality of your
data
from the attacker. Not as a means of detecting an attack on your data.
And also this isn't really just user data, the hibernation image is
the kernel. If it's really compromised, it's a complete end run around
the guarantees of Secure Boot so necessarily it can't be weaker than
that implementation or the whole implementation is weakened. If it's
easier to exploit via the hibernation image, that's what attackers
will do.
making an unencrypted image tamper safe by signing it, is just
unnecessary work frpm the POV of security as it stays insecure:
a) an attacker can read the content and gain informations
b) he can change the data on disk and just wait for a reboot.
Signing the image for the pure integrity of the data structures to be
(technically) "safe" to load
is a whole different story and a gerneral good idea. But don't mix
"safe" with "secure", it's not secure.
Best regards,
Marius