On Wednesday, 12 November 2008 at 21:09, Jesse Keating wrote:
On Wed, 2008-11-12 at 21:05 +0100, Enrico Scholz wrote:
>
> This thread is about a *server* SIG, isn't it? Most servers do not need
> disk encryption as they are located in physically secured rooms. They
> must be able to reboot without manual interaction too.
>
> Hence, when password prompts are the only reason for plymouth, then
> plymouth should be optional; especially when it has heavy dependencies
> like pango.
Don't be so sure about that. In a colo environment I /would/ want some
encryption on the disk, and if I have to use a remote kvm to input the
passphrase at reboot time, that's OK.
And don't worry about sniffers attached to the KVM. Why would you?
Who decided that it was a jolly good idea to make plymouth essential?
I don't need a fancy progress bar that drags in tens of MBs of dependencies,
thank you. After all, nobody is going to see it anyway.
Regards,
R.
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