On Sun, Aug 20, 2006 at 12:54:30PM +0200, Christian Rose wrote:
On 8/19/06, Arthur Pemberton <pemboa(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>Why does FC ship openssh with sshd allowing root logins? And are there
>any plans to preempt the now routine sshd weak password hunting bots?
IIRC, the idea was that you should not end up with being locked out of
a remote system if that system's /home NFS mount was somehow screwed
up. With allowing root to log in, you could still fix a remote system
using NFS-mounted home directories.
Not to mention that kerberos/ldap/nis/whatever might be down so user
logins might not be available.
In any case wouldn't it better to start using pam_access by default in
system_auth and block root logins if you want there? I don't see why sshd
should be treated differently than other tools in the system.
Anaconda, authconfig can ask questions at install time like:
Allow root logins: [X] Local, [] Everywhere, [] By domain ..., etc.
Allow user logins: [] Local, [X] Everywhere, [] By domain ..., etc.
and setup an access.conf file.
Kostas