Wei, Gang (gang.wei(a)intel.com) said:
> If you're attempting to create a framework that attests the
integrity
> of systems for use by 'trusted' software, it would (in theory) only be as
> secure as its weakest link. Given that... PHP?
I am not sure whether PHP is the weakest link, but the integrity checking done
by OpenAttestation is to ensure the system is running the expected software
like BIOS/OS/etc. As to whether the expected software is secure enough it is
another story.
> How does it intend to attest the OS in a rapidly updating Fedora
> environment? Just the kernel + initramfs? An image-based checksum such
> as what is used in ChromeOS?
By far, just kernel + initramfs. Every time the kernel/initramfs got updated,
the Know Good Value in OpenAttestation Server should be updated to take new
kernel/initramfs as "trusted" one.
Hm, I guess that's OK as far as the feature goes, but that doesn't give me
a lot of good feelings about the level of trust to ascribe to the
OS that's being booted by that kernel & initramfs.
Bill