https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1937364
--- Doc Text *updated* by Eric Christensen <sparks(a)redhat.com> ---
In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability
that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original
HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated
up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request
comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects
(`HttpRequest`, `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent
up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this
may result in request smuggling.
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