On Sun, 22 Aug 2004 00:08, Steve G <linux_4ever(a)yahoo.com> wrote:
Mounting local filesystem
Can't open RNG file /dev/hw_random no such file or directory
enable swap...
I haven't seen this before. I traced the message string to /sbin/rngd. Is
this error something that we should worry about? Something wanted a random
number and it aint gonna get it.
rngd copies data from the hardware random number source to /dev/random (the
kernel random number source). Without it /dev/random gets populated by
key-press intervals, network interrupt times, and other events which may not
be sufficiently random or common.
It seems that rngd expects /dev/hwrandom while udev with the FC3T1 kernel
creates /dev/hw_random. I haven't checked the latest kernel to see whether
this has changed.
Aug 21 09:00:13 buildhost kernel: SELinux: Initializing.
Aug 21 09:00:13 buildhost kernel: SELinux: Starting in permissive mode
Aug 21 09:00:13 buildhost kernel: There is already a security framework
initialized, register_security failed.
Aug 21 09:00:13 buildhost kernel: selinux_register_security: Registering
secondary module capability
Aug 21 09:00:13 buildhost kernel: Capability LSM initialized as secondary
OK, why did selinux fail registering?
Bogus error message. SE Linux needs the capability module for full
functionality but you get an error when both are loaded. Things work fine
anyway.
Aug 21 09:00:16 buildhost kernel: security: 3 users, 4 roles, 251
types,
12 bools
Aug 21 09:00:16 buildhost kernel: security: 53 classes, 3895 rules
Aug 21 09:00:16 buildhost kernel: SELinux: Completing initialization.
SE Linux is just now finishing its init? Why have other daemons and SE
Linux applications been running? Is there a synchonization barrier that
I believe that hotplug is spawned by kernel threads and can start before init.
The policy is loaded and SE Linux init is complete before init starts running
with full functionality (IE before rc.sysinit is run).
stops any SE Linux aware application from running until the whole
rule set
is finished loading? Is there a window of opportunity that a malicious
application could run before SE Linux has done its thing? Like maybe
disable SE Linux?
No. The machine is a long way from multi-user mode at that stage.
Aug 21 09:00:16 buildhost kernel: Adding 2096440k swap on /dev/sda5.
Priority:-1 extents:1
Aug 21 09:00:16 buildhost kernel: audit(1093093168.059:0): avc: denied {
mounton } for pid=1117 exe=/bin/mount path=/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc
dev=proc ino=-268435430 scontext=user_u:system_r:unconfined_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_t tclass=dir
Aug 21 09:00:16 buildhost kernel: audit(1093093168.059:0): avc: denied {
mounton } for pid=1117 exe=/bin/mount path=/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc
dev=proc ino=-268435430 scontext=user_u:system_r:unconfined_t
tcontext=system_u:object_r:sysctl_t tclass=dir
Yep, SE Linux is now active, starting to see avc's.
What script is calling this mount? It's a bug in policy but I'd like to get
more info before making changes.
Aug 21 09:00:18 buildhost crond: crond startup succeeded
Aug 21 09:00:18 buildhost anacron: anacron startup succeeded
Aug 21 09:00:19 buildhost messagebus: messagebus startup succeeded
Aug 21 09:00:19 buildhost haldaemon: haldaemon startup succeeded
OK, way down here at the very end haldaemon is active. Isn't this way late?
I was under the impression that kudzu requires hal. If that means it needs
haldaemon to be active then you are correct and it is too late.
--
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