I put this (attached) together a while back to configure USB device whitelisting through
udev. If it helps, great. If not, please pardon the intrusion.
Brian
From:
scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org<mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org>
[mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf Of Trevor Vaughan
Sent: Friday, April 18, 2014 11:47 AM
To: SCAP Security Guide
Subject: Re: [PATCH] [RHEL/6] Search for nousb kernel command line argument in
/etc/grub.conf within bootloader_nousb_argument check case-insensitively
The authorized and authorized_default files are action toggles.
It looks like you need to check /sys/bus/usb/devices/usb*/authorized_default == 1 for a
failure case.
If those are all '0', then USB is not authorized for any system devices by
default.
Don't have a chance to test right now but I can play more later.
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/usb/authorization.txt
Trevor
On Thu, Apr 17, 2014 at 11:51 PM, Shawn Wells
<shawn@redhat.com<mailto:shawn@redhat.com>> wrote:
On 4/17/14, 12:54 PM, Trevor Vaughan wrote:
Udev is system agnostic and works like a firewall instead of a sledgehammer. Deny all,
allow as approved.
nousb is a sledgehammer, you can't turn it back on without a reboot.
I'm wanting to allow <Vendor> keyboards of type X, not all keyboards that may
have who knows what built into them. Udev lets me do this but nousb doesn't.
As far as I can tell, udev appears to be supported in almost all modern Linux distros and,
if it's not, you can always sledgehammer the system.
That said, I'm certainly happy for the discussion since it's what it takes to move
things forward (in whatever direction).
Reviewed the link you sent over
(
http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/plug-and-prey-malicious-usb-d...).
Specifically:
#Script by Adrian Crenshaw
#With info from Michael Miller, Inaky Perez-Gonzalez and VMWare
#By default, disable it.
#ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEMS=="usb", RUN+="/bin/sh -c 'echo 0
>/sys$DEVPATH/authorized'"
ACTION=="add", SUBSYSTEMS=="usb", RUN+="/bin/sh -c 'for host
in /sys/bus/usb/devices/usb*; do echo 0 > $host/authorized_default; done'"
#Enable hub devices. There may be a better way than this.
ACTION=="add", ATTR{bDeviceClass}=="09", RUN+="/bin/sh -c
'echo 1 >/sys$DEVPATH/authorized'"
#Other things to enable
ACTION=="add", ATTR{idVendor}=="046d",
ATTR{idProduct}=="0809", RUN+="/bin/sh -c 'echo 1
>/sys$DEVPATH/authorized'"
ACTION=="add", ATTR{serial}=="078606B90DD3", RUN+="/bin/sh -c
'echo 1 >/sys$DEVPATH/authorized'"
ACTION=="add", ATTR{product}=="802.11 n WLAN", RUN+="/bin/sh -c
'echo 1 >/sys$DEVPATH/authorized'"
#ACTION=="add", ATTR{idVendor}=="413c",
ATTR{idProduct}=="2106", RUN+="/bin/sh -c 'echo 1
>/sys$DEVPATH/authorized'"
My first reaction was to say "If 'cat $host/authorized_default == 0' or
nousb, then pass || if /sys$DEVPATH/authorized != *, pass"
It's laughable... but I don't own a USB device. Not even a storage token. Since
you're starting the conversation, could you test such a system configuration ou and
see if such an approach is even sane?
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--
Trevor Vaughan
Vice President, Onyx Point, Inc
(410) 541-6699
tvaughan@onyxpoint.com<mailto:tvaughan@onyxpoint.com>
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