Todd,
It's been a long time since I've traced the whole thing (hopefully 140-3 is
clearer) but IIRC it came down to the assurance of the build process as
certified by NIST.
Technically, your local security officer(s) can probably evaluate your
entire local stack and waive that part of the requirement. However, they
would probably have to coordinate with NIST directly to meet the
800-171/CNSSI 1253 requirements for NIST/NSA approved cryptography and I
don't really see that working in reality.
Trevor
On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 10:13 AM Todd, Charles <CTODD(a)ball.com> wrote:
Trevor,
That is most interesting. I fully understand a desire to only accept the
certification on select hardware as choosing the wrong hardware (e.g. ARM
with a different IP stack) might lack important key handling features like
anti-tamper. I'm not sure I see why the compile-time **hardware** makes a
significant difference, given the state of cross-compilers. I would think
that the compile-time **software** would have the greatest influence as it
a direct vector for supply chain attacks.
I've been skimming the FIPS 140-2 doc and the best I can see is that
compile-time hardware is part of "Design Assurance" (Table 1 and section
4.10). All of the other documentation I can see refers to the operating
environment or designing towards a particular (hostile) environment.
I don't doubt that what you say is true given the list of unwritten rules
most organizations have. I'm curious about the basis for such a rule. If
you know and have time to educate, I would be most fascinated to understand
the reasoning.
Thanks,
Charlie Todd
CISSP, Ball Aerospace
-----Original Message-----
From: Trevor Vaughan <tvaughan(a)onyxpoint.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:51 AM
To: SCAP Security Guide <scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org>
Cc: Jeffrey Hawkins <rtswguru(a)hotmail.com>; Ted Brunell <
tbrunell(a)redhat.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Any rumors on next draft for RHEL 8 STIG from DISA?
A note of clarification, for the FIPS certification, the hardware that the
software is built on matters so re-rolling it yourself and/or the CentOS
"binary compatible" rolls aren't part of the certified package.
Do they meet the functional requirements....probably.
Do they meet the legal requirements (NIST 800-53, etc...)....no.
Trevor
On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 9:51 AM Mark Thacker <mthacker(a)redhat.com <mailto:
mthacker(a)redhat.com> > wrote:
Hello all,
A few of items of discussion here:
1. Red Hat validates the shipped crypto modules in RHEL itself.
CentOS Stream is the evolving next release of those same modules. However,
because CentOS Stream is a developer-focused, evolving project, Red Hat
will not be validating the CentOS Stream modules themselves. Any issues,
bugs, functional or security problems discovered in CentOS Stream
(including the crypto modules) would indeed be filed as bugs, and addressed
in CentOS and RHEL.
2. While OpenSCAP and the profiles we build will be included in
CentOS Stream, they are treated as upstream from a support perspective. Our
work flow still starts with the Compliance As Code GIT repository upstream,
through CentOS Stream and into RHEL.
3. To be clear, code modifications and changes required to obtain
certifications such as FIPS and Common Criteria will certainly be reflected
in CentOS Stream (as all changes are, with the exception of embargoed
content). But the certifications themselves will only ever be done on
RHEL itself as that is the stable, long term supported release.
On 1/5/21 5:30 PM, Jeffrey Hawkins wrote:
Hi Mark,
Related topic....Â
Do you know if the FIPS Software Modules/Libraries that
RedHat certifies RHEL8.x will be included in CENTOS Stream (similar to
existing CENTOS approach), or will CENTOS Stream have different Crypto
Software?   Also, any nuances or strategy changes we may need to be
aware of as to OpenScap and Benchmarks for CENTOS Stream?
Jeff
________________________________
From: Mark Thacker <mthacker(a)redhat.com> <mailto:
mthacker(a)redhat.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 27, 2020 8:05 AM
To: SCAP Security Guide <
scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org> <mailto:
scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org> ; Ted Brunell <
tbrunell(a)redhat.com> <mailto:tbrunell@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Any rumors on next draft for RHEL 8 STIG from
DISA?
Â
Hi all,
An update :
* RHEL 8 Common Criteria is in process and we expect to
complete and announce in EARLY Q1 CY2021
* RHEL 8 FIPS is finishing now! Actually, two of our certs
are in hand now for RHEL 8 with three more in the final stages (in
Coordination state). We expect to push a press release when we have all of
the module validation certificates completed.
Again, expect that we will announce more publicly when we
have completed the certifications for each of these standards.
On 12/2/20 4:30 PM, Ted Brunell wrote:
I cannot really talk much about CC and FIPS, but
the STIG is expected to be published by DISA (based on the draft STIG
content on RHEL 8.2 and 8.3) sometime early next year.
DISA may be able to provide a more concise
timeframe. (disa.stig_spt(a)mail.mil <mailto:disa.stig_spt@mail.mil> ).
R/
Ted Brunell
On Wed, Dec 2, 2020 at 12:14 PM Hayden,Robert <
RHAYDEN(a)cerner.com <mailto:RHAYDEN@cerner.com> > wrote:
Curious on if anyone has any information
on the next draft release from DISA on RHEL 8 STIG benchmarks? The one in
May was pretty rough and did not really match where the current upstream
was moving towards.
Â
Thanks in advance
Robert
Â
Robert Hayden | Lead Technology Architect
| Cerner Corporation
Â
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