Talked with Lianbo in bluejeans, we finally worked together to rewrite
the log as below:
~~~~~~~~~~
UEFI Secure boot is a a signatiure verification mechanism, is designed
to prevent malicious code being loaded and executed at the early boot
stage. This makes sure that code executed is trusted by firmware.
Previously, with kexec_file_load() interface, kernel prevents unsigned
kernel image from being loaded if secure boot is enabled. So kdump will
detect whether secure boot is enabled firstly, then decide which interface
is chosen to execute, kexec_load() or kexec_file_load(). Otherwise kernel
loading will fail if secure boot enabled, and kexec_file_load() is entered.
Now, the implementation of kexec_file_load() is adjusted in below commit.
With this change, if CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is not set, unsigned kernel
still has chance to be allowed to be loaded under some conditions.
commit 99d5cadfde2b ("kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and
KEXEC_SIG_FORCE")
And in the current fedora and RHEL, CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE is not set, only
CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG and CONFIG_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG are set on x86_64 by default.
It's time to spread kexec_file_load() onto all systems of x86_64, including
Secute-boot platforms and legacy platforms.
Hence, in this patch, if on x86, lets use the kexec_file_load() only. See if
anything wrong happened in this case, in Fedora firstly for the time being.
~~~~~~~~~~
For the table, change to two columns for signed and unsigned kernel
image. Then in each kind of kernel, singed or unsiged, check on two
kinds of platform, Secure boot or Legacy system. Here Legacy system
includes the non-Secure boot and non -UEFI platforms in the old form
Lianbo listed.
Any idea, feel free to add comment.
And for the fallback kairui mentioned, I think no need to support in
Fedora. Just give kexec_file_load() a full firepower shoot firstly,
let's see what's going to happen.
.-----------------------------------------------------------------------.
| . | signed kernel | unsigned kernel |
| . types |-----------------------|------------------------|
| . | | | | |
| . |Secure boot| Legacy |Secure boot| Legacy |
| options . |-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| . | prev| now | prev| now |prev | now |prev | now |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|------------|
|KEXEC_SIG=y | | | | | | |
|SIG_FORCE is not set |succ |succ |succ |succ | succ | succ |
|BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG=y | | | | | | |
.-----------------------------------------------------------------------.
| . | UEFI(signed) | non UEFI(unsigned) |
| . types |-----------------------|------------------------|
| . | | non | | |
| . |secure boot|secure boot| prev | now |
| options . |-----------|-----------| | |
| . | prev| now | prev| now | | |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|------------|
|KEXEC_SIG=y | | | | | | |
|SIG_FORCE is not set |succ |succ |succ |succ | succ | succ |
|BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG=y | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|------------|
|KEXEC_SIG=y | | | | | | |
|SIG_FORCE is not set | | | | | | |
|BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG is |fail |fail |succ |fail | succ | fail |
|not set | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|------------|
|KEXEC_SIG=y | | | | | | |
|SIG_FORCE=y |succ |succ |succ |fail | succ | fail |
|BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG=y | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|------------|
|KEXEC_SIG=y | | | | | | |
|SIG_FORCE=y | | | | | | |
|BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG is |fail |fail |succ |fail | succ | fail |
|not set | | | | | | |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------|------------|
|KEXEC_SIG is not set | | | | | | |
|SIG_FORCE is not set | | | | | | |
|BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG is |fail |fail |succ |succ | succ | succ |
|not set | | | | | | |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:
[1] 'prev': Without this patch
[2] 'now': With this patch
So, it's time for switching to the kexec_file_load() syscall on x86_64
for kexec-tools.
Signed-off-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang(a)redhat.com>
---
dracut-early-kdump.sh | 4 ++--
kdump-lib.sh | 31 +++++++++++--------------------
kdumpctl | 10 ++++------
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dracut-early-kdump.sh b/dracut-early-kdump.sh
index 69a34eb996cd..bfb923d6efa1 100755
--- a/dracut-early-kdump.sh
+++ b/dracut-early-kdump.sh
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ early_kdump_load()
EARLY_KEXEC_ARGS=$(prepare_kexec_args "${KEXEC_ARGS}")
- if is_secure_boot_enforced; then
- echo "Secure Boot is enabled. Using kexec file based syscall."
+ if use_kexec_file_load; then
+ echo "Using kexec file based syscall."
EARLY_KEXEC_ARGS="$EARLY_KEXEC_ARGS -s"
fi
diff --git a/kdump-lib.sh b/kdump-lib.sh
index f393c76b9cbb..5b6684992553 100755
--- a/kdump-lib.sh
+++ b/kdump-lib.sh
@@ -589,30 +589,21 @@ need_64bit_headers()
print (strtonum("0x" r[2]) > strtonum("0xffffffff"));
}'`
}
-# Check if secure boot is being enforced.
#
-# Per Peter Jones, we need check efivar SecureBoot-$(the UUID) and
-# SetupMode-$(the UUID), they are both 5 bytes binary data. The first four
-# bytes are the attributes associated with the variable and can safely be
-# ignored, the last bytes are one-byte true-or-false variables. If SecureBoot
-# is 1 and SetupMode is 0, then secure boot is being enforced.
+# Currently, Secure Boot is only used on x86_64 and kernel enabled the
+# kexec_file_load() on x86_64 by default.
+# In addition, kernel also enables the option KEXEC_SIG, which makes the
+# kexec_file_load() syscall checks for a valid signature of the kernel
+# image if there is a signature(It must be valid). And the images can
+# still be loaded without a valid signature. So let kexec-tools change
+# as well.
#
-# Assume efivars is mounted at /sys/firmware/efi/efivars.
-is_secure_boot_enforced()
+use_kexec_file_load()
{
- local secure_boot_file setup_mode_file
- local secure_boot_byte setup_mode_byte
+ local arch_name=`uname -m`
- secure_boot_file=$(find /sys/firmware/efi/efivars -name SecureBoot-*
2>/dev/null)
- setup_mode_file=$(find /sys/firmware/efi/efivars -name SetupMode-* 2>/dev/null)
-
- if [ -f "$secure_boot_file" ] && [ -f "$setup_mode_file"
]; then
- secure_boot_byte=$(hexdump -v -e '/1 "%d\ "'
$secure_boot_file|cut -d' ' -f 5)
- setup_mode_byte=$(hexdump -v -e '/1 "%d\ "'
$setup_mode_file|cut -d' ' -f 5)
-
- if [ "$secure_boot_byte" = "1" ] && [
"$setup_mode_byte" = "0" ]; then
- return 0
- fi
+ if [ "$arch_name" == "x86_64" ]; then
+ return 0
fi
return 1
diff --git a/kdumpctl b/kdumpctl
index 2d21a416deb1..d1c987773cf9 100755
--- a/kdumpctl
+++ b/kdumpctl
@@ -678,11 +678,9 @@ load_kdump()
KEXEC_ARGS=$(prepare_kexec_args "${KEXEC_ARGS}")
KDUMP_COMMANDLINE=$(prepare_cmdline "${KDUMP_COMMANDLINE}"
"${KDUMP_COMMANDLINE_REMOVE}" "${KDUMP_COMMANDLINE_APPEND}")
- # For secureboot enabled machines, use new kexec file based syscall.
- # Old syscall will always fail as it does not have capability to
- # to kernel signature verification.
- if is_secure_boot_enforced; then
- echo "Secure Boot is enabled. Using kexec file based syscall."
+ # On x86_64 machine, lets use kexec file based syscall by default.
+ if use_kexec_file_load; then
+ echo "Using kexec file based syscall."
KEXEC_ARGS="$KEXEC_ARGS -s"
fi
@@ -1162,7 +1160,7 @@ stop_fadump()
stop_kdump()
{
- if is_secure_boot_enforced; then
+ if use_kexec_file_load; then
$KEXEC -s -p -u
else
$KEXEC -p -u
--
2.17.1
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