[SSSD] sssdpac_verify() treats krb5_pac_verify() error as fatal - mspac_verify() does not
Alexander Bokovoy
abokovoy at redhat.com
Mon Aug 4 11:24:47 UTC 2014
On Sun, 03 Aug 2014, Thomas Sondergaard wrote:
>Hello,
>
>I've run into a GSSAPI authentication problem that has caused me a
>little time to diagnose, but turns out to only occur with
>sssd_pac_plugin.so present. I am not an AD, Kerberos or sssd expert,
>so let me just present the information I have collected.
>
>Our code, which uses GSSAPI, fails with the following error on a
>Fedora 20 box with sssd-client (sssd_pac_plugin.so) installed with the
>following error codes:
>
>major: 851968='Unspecified GSS failure. Minor code may provide more
>information', minor: 22='Invalid argument'
>
>KRB5_TRACE does not give any useful indication for what goes wrong.
>
>With sssd-client (sssd_pac_plugin.so) removed the GSSAPI
>authentication works. With KRB5_TRACE I get the following warning:
>
>[23801] 1407018816.872001: PAC checksum verification failed:
>-1765328196/Bad encryption type
>
>Looking at the code, I find that without sssd_pac_plugin.so installed
>the following verification function is used:
>
>static krb5_error_code
>mspac_verify(krb5_context kcontext,
> krb5_authdata_context context,
> void *plugin_context,
> void *request_context,
> const krb5_auth_context *auth_context,
> const krb5_keyblock *key,
> const krb5_ap_req *req)
>{
> krb5_error_code code;
> struct mspac_context *pacctx = (struct mspac_context *)request_context;
>
> if (pacctx->pac == NULL)
> return EINVAL;
>
> code = krb5_pac_verify(kcontext, pacctx->pac,
> req->ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
> req->ticket->enc_part2->client, key, NULL);
> if (code != 0)
> TRACE_MSPAC_VERIFY_FAIL(kcontext, code);
>
> /*
> * If the above verification failed, don't fail the whole
>authentication,
> * just don't mark the PAC as verified. A checksum mismatch can
>occur if
> * the PAC was copied from a cross-realm TGT by an ignorant KDC,
>and Apple
> * Mac OS X Server Open Directory (as of 10.6) generates PACs with no
> * server checksum at all.
> */
> return 0;
>}
>
>
>This incarnation of the mspac_verify() function is from
>
>commit 76ebe5d07c1002b674eb1c4e3ab35f6001eec91c
>Author: Greg Hudson <ghudson at mit.edu>
>Date: Wed Feb 16 23:34:37 2011 +0000
>
> Don't reject AP-REQs based on PACs
>
> Experience has shown that it was a mistake to fail AP-REQ verification
> based on failure to verify the signature of PAC authdata contained in
> the ticket. We've had two rounds of interoperability issues with the
> hmac-md5 checksum code, an interoperability issue OSX generating
> unsigned PACs, and another problem where PACs are copied by older KDCs
> from a cross-realm TGT into the service ticket. If a PAC signature
> cannot be verified, just don't mark it as verified and continue on
> with the AP exchange.
>
> ticket: 6870
> target_version: 1.9.1
> tags: pullup
>
> git-svn-id: svn://anonsvn.mit.edu/krb5/trunk@24640
>dc483132-0cff-0310-8789-dd5450dbe970
>
>
>
>With sssd-client (sssd_pac_plugin.so) installed the function
>sssdpac_verify is used instead, which looks like this
>(sssd-client-1.11.6-1):
>
>static krb5_error_code sssdpac_verify(krb5_context kcontext,
> krb5_authdata_context context,
> void *plugin_context,
> void *request_context,
> const krb5_auth_context
>*auth_context,
> const krb5_keyblock *key,
> const krb5_ap_req *req)
>{
> krb5_error_code kerr;
> int ret;
> krb5_pac pac;
> struct sssd_context *sssdctx = (struct sssd_context *)request_context;
> struct sss_cli_req_data sss_data;
> int errnop;
>
> if (sssdctx == NULL || sssdctx->data.data == NULL) {
> return EINVAL;
> }
>
> kerr = krb5_pac_parse(kcontext, sssdctx->data.data,
> sssdctx->data.length, &pac);
> if (kerr != 0) {
> return EINVAL;
> }
>
> kerr = krb5_pac_verify(kcontext, pac,
> req->ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
> req->ticket->enc_part2->client, key, NULL);
> if (kerr != 0) {
> return EINVAL;
> }
>
> sss_data.len = sssdctx->data.length;
> sss_data.data = sssdctx->data.data;
>
> ret = sss_pac_make_request(SSS_PAC_ADD_PAC_USER, &sss_data,
> NULL, NULL, &errnop);
> if (ret != 0) {
> /* Ignore the error */
> }
>
> return 0;
>}
>
>The krb5_pac_verify header documentation from krb5.h has this to say:
>
> * @note A checksum mismatch can occur if the PAC was copied from a
>cross-realm
> * TGT by an ignorant KDC; also Apple Mac OS X Server Open Directory (as of
> * 10.6) generates PACs with no server checksum at all. One should
>consider
> * not failing the whole authentication because of this reason, but,
>instead,
> * treating the ticket as if it did not contain a PAC or marking the PAC
> * information as non-verified.
>
>So, sssdpac_verify() treats krb5_pack_verify() errors as fatal,
>whereas krb5's mspac_verify() does not. This is all the information
>that I have gathered. It looks to me like sssd-client
>(sssd_pac_plugin.so) is not doing this right, but I'm looking forward
>to your comments.
I think you are on the right way here. We need to shortcut to return 0
there instead of EINVAL because unverified PAC wouldn't need to be added
to the cache.
Jakub, can you change the
if (kerr != 0) {
return EINVAL;
}
to
if (kerr != 0) {
return 0;
}
here?
Unfortunately, since tracing code is not available outside internals of
libkrb5, we cannot inject TRACE_MSPAC_VERIFY_FAIL(kcontext, kerr); here.
--
/ Alexander Bokovoy
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