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Agreed. The criteria by which we're supposed to be deciding which
things are important (and their respective degrees of importance)
points directly to impact on
confidentiality/integrity/availability. I'm not seeing how the
login banner addresses any of those areas.<br>
<br>
On 11/25/2012 07:19 PM, Jeffrey Blank wrote:
<blockquote
cite="mid:CALjtS7L++9uz=UpBssLMXVvY6b1DJv0yz6NQ+pjyxLUyBgwFhg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">All this trouble to achieve a separate click for
banner consent is such an absurd misprioritization of security
resources, and it's painful to watch. Always remember that this
sort of security/policy theatre competes with patching systems and
reviewing logs.<br>
<br>
Two points:<br>
1)<br>
I continue to await any evidence that login banners have ever been
a decisive factor in any sort of legal proceeding.<br>
<br>
2)<br>
If a vendor's product cannot be trivially configured to ask for a
separate click for banner acceptance out-of-the-box, then this
should simply be documented and we should all move on. It can
become an accepted "risk" (ha, ha) for use of the product. <br>
<br>
This is a far smarter move than trying to add or maintain even
more software. But this has been an excellent discussion, and
highly illustrative with regard to how well-intended policies
result in devotion of resources.<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 6:50 AM, Robert
Sanders <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:rsanders@trustedcs.com" target="_blank">rsanders@trustedcs.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
Pretty close. User sits down at console, sees authentication
screen with short blat about needing to agree to the 'consent
to monitor'. User authenticates, X starts up and the first
thing they see *after* that is the full login banner (with
either an acknowledgement button or a accept/deny - depending
on guideline). User's selection is logged, and either
proceeds with the remainder of the login or returns to the
authentication screen depending on their choice.<br>
There is some changes at the front end on *how* the first
message is displayed (what we call the pre-login banner), but
the user is presented the 'official' login banner (IE - the
DoD Banner) pretty early in the Session setup. Doing it this
way they know they'll have to see the banner, they login, are
presented with the banner, and have to agree to it before the
login continues.<br>
<br>
-Rob<br>
<br>
________________________________________<br>
From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
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[<a moz-do-not-send="true"
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on behalf of Shawn Wells [<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:shawn@redhat.com">shawn@redhat.com</a>]<br>
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 9:33 PM<br>
To: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org">scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org</a><br>
Subject: Re: Alternate way to to graphical login banner,
with logging of acceptence<br>
<div class="HOEnZb">
<div class="h5"><br>
On 10/25/12 3:29 PM, Robert Sanders wrote:<br>
<br>
Greetings all,<br>
As I mentioned in the conference call, we have a
slightly different way of doing the login banner that also
gets the user's acknowledgement sent to /var/log/secure
(or the equivalent). I should note that our tool helps
with remediating a box against several different
guidelines. Hence we tried to find as 'simple' a way to
do this as possible, without large banners looking
seriously cramped (IE - cram the full DoD login banner
into the default authentication dialog on a small screen).
We also tried to support both pure Gnome (GDM) and KDE
(kdm). I'll handwave through the details (ping me if
you'd like more info).<br>
<br>
Basically we add wording to the main login with text
along the lines of:<br>
All users will be required to read and accept a
'Consent to Monitor' statement before being allowed to
login.<br>
The response will be logged.<br>
<br>
This text fits nicely on most of the OS's we support,
and is shown on every graphical login attempt on the main
authentication display. Currently for GDM on Fedora/RHEL6
we make these changes to /apps/gdm/simple-greeter/*, most
of the other Linux boxes we'll change the
/etc/X11/gdm/gdm.conf or /etc/gdm/custom.conf file
instead. For KDM it all goes to
/usr/share/config/kdm/kdmrc.<br>
<br>
To display the actual required login banner we tweak the
/etc/X11/gdm/PreSession/Default (Solaris),
/etc/X11/xdm/Xsession (RH4), or /etc/X11/xinit/Xsession
(everyone else) file to call a script that uses zenity or
kdialog (use first one found) to display the text of the
banner. Since we do support other guidelines that may
just require notification, we have our dialog may just
have an acknowledgement button or an explicit accept/deny
button. The user's response is logged using the first of
/usr/sbin/logger, /sbin/logger, /usr/bin/logger, or
/bin/logger with authpriv.notice. Obviously if the user
hits deny we fail out back to the authentication screen.<br>
<br>
Disadvantages : change to expected login
procedure/alternate login mananger, extra script on login<br>
Advantages : acknowledgement tied that the login
banner was accepted/read to a particular user, better
framing of potentially large banner text<br>
<br>
<br>
I'm interested in the concept of logging the user
acceptance, but I'm not sure I understand the process your
users follow. From what I gather a user attempts to login
via GUI, is presented with the standard DoD banner, then
is presented with your custom prompt of which logs their
response?<br>
<br>
<br>
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