[PATCH 06/26] Mapped CCI-000025 to requirement_unclear.

Shawn Wells shawn at redhat.com
Fri Jun 29 22:35:18 UTC 2012


On 6/29/12 5:45 PM, Willy Santos wrote:
> CCI-000025 refers to enforcing information flow control based on explicit security attributes. This mapping is open to discussion and change.

SRG-OS-000009 	CCI-000025 	The operating system must enforce information 
flow control using explicit security attributes on information, source, 
and destination objects as a basis for flow control decisions. 
Information flow control regulates where information is allowed to 
travel within an information system and between information systems (as 
opposed to who is allowed to access the information) and without 
explicit regard to subsequent accesses to the information. Examples of 
flow control restrictions include: keeping export controlled information 
from being transmitted in the clear to the Internet; and blocking 
outside traffic claiming to be from within the organization and not 
passing any web requests to the Internet that are not from the internal 
web proxy. Information flow control policies and enforcement mechanisms 
are commonly employed by organizations to control the flow of 
information between designated sources and destinations (e.g., networks, 
individuals, devices) within information systems and between 
interconnected systems. Flow control is based on the characteristics of 
the information and/or the information path. Information flow 
enforcement mechanisms compare security attributes on all information 
(data content and data structure), source and destination objects, and 
respond appropriately (e.g., block, quarantine, alert administrator) 
when the mechanisms encounter information flows not explicitly allowed 
by the information flow policy. Information flow enforcement using 
explicit security attributes can be used, for example, to control the 
release of certain types of information.



Source and destination are easy -- IPTables. It's when "security 
attributes" come into play that I get caught up. Technically we can 
enforce this by mandating MCS or MLS enablement. This requirement makes 
sense if we were to make a CNSS 12-53 profile, but I'm not convinced 
this makes sense for a general purpose security guide.

  unmet_impractical_guidance in my opinion
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