On Sat, Jan 23, 2010 at 6:19 PM, Stephen John Smoogen <smooge(a)gmail.com> wrote:
On Sat, Jan 23, 2010 at 4:58 PM, Steve Grubb
> On Wednesday 20 January 2010 01:50:21 pm Stephen John Smoogen wrote:
>> >> * Write to system logs (with the exception that the 'cause to be
>> >> performed' provision is waived in this case)
>> > Huh ? The mere fact of me logging in will cause system logs to be
>> > written...
>> You are not writing directly to /var/log/messages. You log in and
>> login sends a message to syslogd which writes to the log.
> Syslog has *no* integrity guarantees, only the audit logs do. Any user can run
> the /usr/bin/logger program and flood syslog. You can also call openlog() and
> tell it you are the kernel. Syslog is worthless from a security PoV.
I was talking a different type of integrity (i think it is integrity).
A user might be able to run logger over and over but a user can not
'cat /dev/null > /var/log/messages' and have it null the file out.
Couldn't even the audit logs be 'played' with in a default system by
running a program that hit a couple of rules over and over again?
[Well I think it would used to because of a bad rule I once crafted to
watch access to /etc/shadow and a program that checked to see if the
file had been changed.] Yes audit and the kernel can be set up to
shut down the system if it fills but in the default system is that the
Sorry.. my email yesterday was rather grumpy. Isn't there a general
security outline for what a non-priveledged Unix user can and can not
do on a system in one of the various security guides? If the work has
been done before, we should use that.
Stephen J Smoogen.
Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp. Or what's a heaven for?
-- Robert Browning