-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 09/25/2014 11:01 AM, John Hodrien wrote:
On Thu, 25 Sep 2014, Joakim Tjernlund wrote:
> Yes, it is "my" job, not sssd's. Currently sssd dictate that no
> system ever should be allowed to login as root, no matter what.
SSSD dictates that no system should be allowed to login as root
via SSSD, and that's not quite the same. You're a corner case
where you're working against standard practice, but I can see why
you think it should be possible to configure SSSD to allow it,
given that you can strip away these sanity checks from PAM.
Just to reiterate what I said elsewhere in this thread (without CCing
Joakim, sorry):
There are two reasons why SSSD refuses to handle root:
1) If SSSD was to crash, only root is capable of restarting it,
debugging it or otherwise fixing the problem. So if you hit a bug and
SSSD was the mechanism you used to log in as root, it cannot be fixed
short of a reboot (and if the bug happens on every run because there
was a regression in an update, your system is hosed.)
2) Without root in /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow, it's impossible to
boot into single-user mode to fix any issues with the early boot process.
These are the reasons that SSSD doesn't handle the root user. It's not
a matter of a default, it's a matter of protecting users from an
inevitable catastrophe. No matter how hard we try, bugs will always
creep in. If you can't get in to fix them, then a bug becomes a disaster.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1
iEYEARECAAYFAlQkNmgACgkQeiVVYja6o6O/MQCffI/GNic0XVAKazJkMeDv4aDU
TIYAn0tZLUHAYFUiW1xoNKBITVCJRUdg
=amSE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----