On Wednesday 25 May 2005 03:06, Valdis.Kletnieks(a)vt.edu wrote:
On Tue, 24 May 2005 10:47:12 EDT, Stephen Smalley said:
> On Sun, 2005-05-22 at 21:53 -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks(a)vt.edu wrote:
> > Am I the only one here who thinks that this is really something that
> > can't be supported in the context of the 'targeted' policy, and
would
> > be much easier to do in 'strict'?
>
> It shouldn't be done at all, other than to dontaudit these attempts. No
> legitimate reason for a CGI script to be probing init's /proc/pid files.
I've always been leery of using dontaudit to shut things up - it means that
there's a possibility that we miss the early warning signs of an actual
attack.
If you want to complain about dontaudit then look for file_type -
secure_file_type as the thing you want to complain about.
I wonder if the cgi script is just doing something like 'ps
ax|grep
mydaemon' to see if a daemon is running...
If the cgi script does "ps ax" as a regular operation then there's no way to
determine the difference between that and "ps ax" for a hostile operation.
Some people don't have cgi scripts running ps. We could have a boolean about
this, but if so then the number of booleans would explode and become
unmanagable.
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