Allow me to describe the reasoning here a little bit more, also as a
touchstone for future discussions.
For these queries, we must ask ourselves:
1) does this protect against some kind of threat?
2) does this satisfy (and not merely vaguely associate) with some kind
of policy requirement?
No? Then flush it.
All the partitions for which we currently provide Rules to enforce the
noexec option are those which could be used (by any user, or an
unprivileged attacker) to trivially write executable content and run it.
The other partitions you've mentioned do not have this issue as they do
not permit unprivileged processes to write to them, and thus this threat
does not exist. (And if this suddenly becomes possible, then root
privileges have already been compromised.) Admittedly even requiring
this noexec is not a strong defense, due to the plentiful presence of
interpreters on the system, but we had judged it to have some value in
I will in the future try to engage in more informational discourse
instead of just expressing aggravation. Yet the major point remains:
current C&A processes thwart effective security behavior, because they
consume time by requiring intricate focus on elements of relatively
little importance. All pales in comparison to running the latest OS
and applying all security updates. This project is intended to help
make that possible.
On 08/31/2012 05:25 PM, Jeffrey Blank wrote:
Yes indeed. But you've got bigger problems if somebody was able
start writing there to begin with. I was unable to conjure a security
argument strong enough to justify typing this, much less requiring it.
While terribly tempting and very much in the C&A mindset, I would
generally prefer that we avoid erecting gates like this:
On 08/30/2012 09:43 PM, Shawn Wells wrote:
> On 8/28/12 10:29 AM, Jeffrey Blank wrote:
>> ACK to these minor changes.
>> I don't see the value in noexec on /var/log and /var/log/audit, and
>> there had better be clear value in anything that is added.
> Some places mount it with noexec as there should be no executables on
> those partitions, while others don't. Wanted to bring it up for discussion.
> scap-security-guide mailing list
scap-security-guide mailing list