Trevor makes an interesting point.
Representing a specific security policy is just one use case for a "profile".
A profile is just statement about a set of controls: a collection of controls plus
A profile explicitly about audit rules, for example, could be a useful training tool.
Another profile focused on services or libraries, could be useful gathering an adhoc
inventory across many systems.
Sent from my iPhone
On Sep 16, 2014, at 6:06 PM, Trevor Vaughan
"Not to mention no single SCAP benchmark can encompass all of the minimum required
controls from the different control families"
I'm not so sure about this one. Or rather, I'm wondering if a single SCAP
benchmark can encompass the *maximum* required controls from the different control
In theory, a cross matrix of all regulations should provide a system that meets all
regulations (and is probably unusable, but that's a different issue).
Do we have actual conflicting guidance between regs?
> On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 9:39 AM, Chen, Wei (Contractor)(CFPB)
> That sounds great on paper, but it's a one size fits all approach that neglects
the fact that not all systems will have the same set of controls. The set of controls may
be different based on the control selection and tailoring process that each system has to
go through. Not to mention no single SCAP benchmark can encompass all of the minimum
required controls from the different control families.
> Wei Chen
> On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Trey Henefield < trey.henefield(a)ultra-ats.com>
> > That is a great breakdown Shawn!
> > I think it would it be useful to create profiles that align with the
> > RMF IA control baselines (low, moderate, high) and also include
> > profiles that build upon the IA control baseline profiles to
> > additionally support the current 5 overlays (CNSSI No. 1253).
> > Best regards,
> > Trey Henefield, CISSP
> > Senior IAVA Engineer
> > Ultra Electronics
> > Advanced Tactical Systems, Inc.
> > 4101 Smith School Road
> > Building IV, Suite 100
> > Austin, TX 78744 USA
> > Trey.Henefield(a)ultra-ats.com
> > Tel: +1 512 327 6795 ext. 647
> > Fax: +1 512 327 8043
> > Mobile: +1 512 541 6450
> > www.ultra-ats.com
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: scap-security-guide-bounces(a)lists.fedorahosted.org [mailto:
> > scap-security-guide-bounces(a)lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf Of Shawn
> > Wells
> > Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 6:26 AM
> > To: scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org
> > Subject: Re: DIACAP vs DIARMF & STIGs & CCEs.
> > On 9/15/14, 5:02 PM, Greg Elin wrote:
> > > I was wondering if anyone was available to explain DIACAP transition
> > > to DIARMF and what it means for STIGS and SSG?
> > >
> > > Happy to have a public email thread, but also happy to take it offline.
> > >
> > > Here is my summary understanding.
> > >
> > > DoD developed its own list of information assurance controls under
> > > DIACAP (DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation
> > > Process).
> > >
> > > In recent years (2010-2012), the DIACAP started transitioning to
> > > DIARMF (DoD Information Assurance Risk Management Framework) to
> > > align it with NIST RMF, and to bring the catalog of controls into
> > > alignment with the controls listed in 800-53, with some special
> > > overlays available for Defense-related systems.
> > >
> > > As of Spring 2014, that transition is complete.
> > >
> > > But I'm trying to make sure I understand how the STIGs play into all
> > > of this. When I look at the STIGs, I see different control number
> > > tracking than from the 800-53s or the CCEs.
> > >
> > > Is it the case that the Control catalog is now 800-53r4 for both
> > > civilian and DoD, but DoD is using STIGs to get to platform specific
> > > details while civilian side is using CCEs?
> > >
> > > If there were just 5 or 6 documents about current/active control
> > > catalogs, what would they be? 800-137, 800-53, 8510.1 and/or ... ???
> > >
> > > Thanks...
> > The various RMF implementations call out NIST 800-53 as the place to
> > derive implementation requirements.
> > When DoD (via DISA FSO) goes through NIST 800-53 and pulls out things
> > they care about, they call it a STIG.
> > When Civilian (via NIST) goes through, the output is called USGCB.
> > NIST 800-53 has some high-level framework control, e.g. "ABC-1,"
> > say something along "Do secure passwords, using [agency defined]
> > values for length and complexity."
> > DISA FSO then takes that requirement defines it further into "Control
> > Correlation Identifiers":
> > CCI-12345 Passwords must be 12 characters
> > CCI-12346 Passwords must contain 2 upper case
> > CCI-12347 Passwords must contain 2 special chars
> > DISA has an entire spreadsheet of these CCI controls per product
> > category
> > -- they call these the Security Requirements Guide (SRG). The one RHEL
> > must follow is the operating System SRG, and you can find the
> > underlying RHEL7 STIG requirements here:
> > http://people.redhat.com/swells/RHEL7_STIG_REQUIREMENTS.xlsx
> > When a vendor such as Red Hat creates implementation guidance --
> > exactly what variable to change in some specific file -- that is
> > mapped to a Configuration Control Enumerator (CCE).
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