Another FIPS thing that is subtle but may come in late in your purchase cycle to bite you
is:
Is the supervisory module of a server FIPS-compliant?
This is a board with its own processor and memory.
For example, HPE's iLO4:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140sp/140sp2574.pdf
It matters for both setup (at beginning of use) and sanitizing (at end of use).
Regards, Scott
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-----Original Message-----
From: Todd, Charles <CTODD(a)ball.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 7:13 AM
To: SCAP Security Guide <scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org>
Cc: Jeffrey Hawkins <rtswguru(a)hotmail.com>; Ted Brunell
<tbrunell(a)redhat.com>
Subject: EXT :RE: [EXTERNAL] Re: Any rumors on next draft for RHEL 8 STIG from DISA?
Trevor,
That is most interesting. I fully understand a desire to only accept the certification on
select hardware as choosing the wrong hardware (e.g. ARM with a different IP stack) might
lack important key handling features like anti-tamper. I'm not sure I see why the
compile-time **hardware** makes a significant difference, given the state of
cross-compilers. I would think that the compile-time **software** would have the greatest
influence as it a direct vector for supply chain attacks.
I've been skimming the FIPS 140-2 doc and the best I can see is that compile-time
hardware is part of "Design Assurance" (Table 1 and section 4.10). All of the
other documentation I can see refers to the operating environment or designing towards a
particular (hostile) environment.
I don't doubt that what you say is true given the list of unwritten rules most
organizations have. I'm curious about the basis for such a rule. If you know and
have time to educate, I would be most fascinated to understand the reasoning.
Thanks,
Charlie Todd
CISSP, Ball Aerospace
-----Original Message-----
From: Trevor Vaughan <tvaughan(a)onyxpoint.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 6, 2021 9:51 AM
To: SCAP Security Guide <scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org>
Cc: Jeffrey Hawkins <rtswguru(a)hotmail.com>; Ted Brunell
<tbrunell(a)redhat.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: Any rumors on next draft for RHEL 8 STIG from DISA?
A note of clarification, for the FIPS certification, the hardware that the software is
built on matters so re-rolling it yourself and/or the CentOS "binary compatible"
rolls aren't part of the certified package.
Do they meet the functional requirements....probably.
Do they meet the legal requirements (NIST 800-53, etc...)....no.
Trevor
On Wed, Jan 6, 2021 at 9:51 AM Mark Thacker <mthacker(a)redhat.com
<mailto:mthacker@redhat.com> > wrote:
Hello all,
A few of items of discussion here:
1. Red Hat validates the shipped crypto modules in RHEL itself. CentOS Stream is the
evolving next release of those same modules. However, because CentOS Stream is a
developer-focused, evolving project, Red Hat will not be validating the CentOS Stream
modules themselves. Any issues, bugs, functional or security problems discovered in CentOS
Stream (including the crypto modules) would indeed be filed as bugs, and addressed in
CentOS and RHEL.
2. While OpenSCAP and the profiles we build will be included in CentOS Stream, they are
treated as upstream from a support perspective. Our work flow still starts with the
Compliance As Code GIT repository upstream, through CentOS Stream and into RHEL.
3. To be clear, code modifications and changes required to obtain certifications such as
FIPS and Common Criteria will certainly be reflected in CentOS Stream (as all changes are,
with the exception of embargoed content). But the certifications themselves will only
ever be done on RHEL itself as that is the stable, long term supported release.
On 1/5/21 5:30 PM, Jeffrey Hawkins wrote:
Hi Mark,
Related topic....Â
Do you know if the FIPS Software Modules/Libraries that RedHat certifies RHEL8.x will be
included in CENTOS Stream (similar to existing CENTOS approach), or will CENTOS Stream
have different Crypto Software?   Also, any nuances or strategy changes we may need to
be aware of as to OpenScap and Benchmarks for CENTOS Stream?
Jeff
________________________________
From: Mark Thacker <mthacker(a)redhat.com> <mailto:mthacker@redhat.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 27, 2020 8:05 AM
To: SCAP Security Guide <scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org>
<mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org> ; Ted Brunell
<tbrunell(a)redhat.com> <mailto:tbrunell@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Any rumors on next draft for RHEL 8 STIG from DISA?
Â
Hi all,
An update :
* RHEL 8 Common Criteria is in process and we expect to complete and announce in EARLY
Q1 CY2021
* RHEL 8 FIPS is finishing now! Actually, two of our certs are in hand now for RHEL 8
with three more in the final stages (in Coordination state). We expect to push a press
release when we have all of the module validation certificates completed.
Again, expect that we will announce more publicly when we have completed the
certifications for each of these standards.
On 12/2/20 4:30 PM, Ted Brunell wrote:
I cannot really talk much about CC and FIPS, but the STIG is expected to be published
by DISA (based on the draft STIG content on RHEL 8.2 and 8.3) sometime early next year.
DISA may be able to provide a more concise timeframe. (disa.stig_spt(a)mail.mil
<mailto:disa.stig_spt@mail.mil> ).
R/
Ted Brunell
On Wed, Dec 2, 2020 at 12:14 PM Hayden,Robert <RHAYDEN(a)cerner.com
<mailto:RHAYDEN@cerner.com> > wrote:
Curious on if anyone has any information on the next draft release from DISA on RHEL 8
STIG benchmarks? The one in May was pretty rough and did not really match where the
current upstream was moving towards.
Â
Thanks in advance
Robert
Â
Robert Hayden | Lead Technology Architect | Cerner Corporation
Â
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