The profile would need to be modified to only cover those items present in
the container.
This matches the usual prose of "run only what you need". If the rules
cannot be easily tailored to the environment that's a failure of the rules,
not the environment.
Trevor
On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 6:10 AM Jan Cerny <jcerny(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Hi,
I understand the changes in container practices. But I have some concerns.
For example, if we scan a container and evaluate the rule "service
chronyd must be enabled" and the service isn't enabled in the
container.
The scanner will return the result "fail". Should we expect the user
to review and waive the results that this particular container isn't
supposed to run chronyd?
Then, there are also containerized services not managed by systemd,
but defined as container's entrypoint in Dockerfiles.
Another example are the kernel options. Should the scanner somehow
detect whether the container contains kernel modules and if not return
"notapplicable"?
Or should we leave this up to the user and waiving?
If we enable the rules, how to prevent false positives? Is the way to
create tailored profiles for certain types of containers?
Regards
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 6:42 PM Gabe Alford <redhatrises(a)gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Containers are changing from where we originally thought certain
practices were going to hold true. These ideas and practices no longer hold
true.
> Kernel modules are going to start to be installed, delivered, and
configured through containers (delivered by Red Hat). SSH servers are now
running in containers (some delivered by Red Hat).
> Systemd is running in containers (some also delivered by Red Hat).
>
> Security and security content is not what someone thinks should or
shouldn't be in a container. It is about ensuring the container is secured
properly.
> By not evaluating certain security rules, the container is considered
less compliant and more vulnerable especially with the change in what is
happening to containers.
>
> Also, what OpenSCAP can and cannot do should never be the determining
factor in security content as many other security vendors consume our
content that don't have the same limitations that OpenSCAP does.
> The world has and is changing how it uses containers so that our
original assumptions are no longer valid. This (and the fact that others
consume our content) is why many PRs are reverting the machine platform.
>
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 10:16 AM Matej Tyc <matyc(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hello everybody,
>> there are now numerous PRs upstream now that disable the machine
platform designation of certain rules - see
https://github.com/ComplianceAsCode/content/pulls?q=is%3Apr+is%3Aopen+pla...
>> Historically, this project uses one profile that is intended to scan
both running systems and container images. Obviously, scanning of lifeless
filesystems (a.k.a offline scanning) is limited, and the machine platform
has been used to control rule applicability to such environments (i.e.
environments other than running bare-metal systems or VMs).
>> This way is cheap, a bit dirty, and the following categories of rules
ended up being machine-only:
>>
>> Rules that are not applicable in containers, or rules that represent
serious antipatterns (e.g. kernel-related rules, partition-related rules)
>> Rules that can't be checked for in offline scans due to OVAL
limitations (anything that requires the /proc filesystem)
>> Rules that represent a likely antipattern (systemd in containers)
>> Rules that OpenSCAP can't properly offline-scan.
>>
>> It is quite clear that in case No. 4, removal of the machine platform
is the right thing to do, although it is likely to cause problems
elsewhere. However, it is at best questionable in case 3. For example,
there is a way to determine whether we are scanning a filesystem of a
systemd-powered container, and execute the check accordingly, but until all
the bits are in place, removing the platform from the rule will make the
situation worse for the majority of use cases.
>> Therefore, I suggest that we reach a consensus about what to do with
those PRs, as they are making the list of open PRs difficult to navigate in.
>> My proposal is to close all PRs that touch rules falling into
categories 1-3, as those PRs don't make the situation any better.
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