On 9/25/13 10:48 AM, Josh Kayse wrote:
On 09/25/2013 10:40 AM, Saxon, William G CIV SPAWARSYSCEN-ATLANTIC, 58810 wrote:
The CTO to which David is referring is 10-17 (28 July 2010) which mandates that HBSS be deployed on all Linux and Unix systems.

I asked DISA about the HBSS/SELinux conflict and this was their reply:

"SELinux is not compatible with HBSS...you can either use SELinux as is and submit a waiver to Cybercom, disable the SE features and install the required point product(s) (if possible), or migrate to a different OS."

There are *so* many things wrong with that response you received.

s/SELinux is not compatible with HBSS/HBSS is not compatible with SELinux/r

Anyway.

When I contacted the HBSS office to find out how to get a waiver, they told me that a waiver was not necessary and that there was a "verbal understanding" between Cybercom and HBSS to give *nix systems flexibility in their configuration until the HBSS/SELinux conflict is resolved which is why Brain's system made it through IV&V.

FWIW, we (NSA + Red Hat) reached out to DISA FSO to get this sorted. We'll see how things shake out, with aspirations for some type of formally documented note in the STIG.

Granted, informal "understandings" within the DoD make me nervous but that is where we are in right now.  So what's the best way to articulate this within a STIG?  Beats me.  I suggest the following for group discussion:

============================
Group ID (Vulid): V-38667
Group Title: SRG-OS-000196
Rule ID: SV-50468r1_rule
Severity: CAT II
Rule Version (STIG-ID): RHEL-06-000285 Rule Title: The system must have a host-based intrusion detection tool and/or a host-based intrusion prevention tool installed.

Vulnerability Discussion: Adding host-based intrusion detection tools can provide the capability to automatically take actions in response to malicious behavior, which can provide additional agility in reacting to network threats. These tools also often include a reporting capability to provide network awareness of the system, which may not otherwise exist in an organization's systems management regime.  For DoD systems, the McAfee Host-based Security System (HBSS) is provided to fulfill this role. Adding host-based intrusion prevention tools increases system security by confining privileged programs and user sessions.  SELinux is provided to fulfill this role.  At this time, HBSS and SELinux are not compatible.

This is a good start, though to be fair, while SELinux plays a key role in holistic host-based intrusion prevention, it is *not* particularly an intrusion detection tool of itself. There's validity in keeping the two (HIPS, HIDS) as separate requirements.

<snip>

What if the last 3 sentences were:
Adding host-based intrusion prevention tools increases system security by confining privileged programs and user sessions.  SELinux can be configured to fulfill the security prevention role.  At this time, HBSS and SELinux are not compatible.
Perhaps a remapping of SSG rules back to CCIs could be used. The language from the requirement:

SRG-OS-000196
180.a. The system must have a host-based intrusion detection tool installed.
<VulnDiscussion>Adding host-based intrusion detection tools can provide the capability to automatically take actions in response to malicious behavior, which can provide additional agility in reacting to network threats. These tools also often include a reporting capability to provide network awareness of system, which may not otherwise exist in an organization's systems management regime.</VulnDiscussion>

Remediation instructions
The base Red Hat platform already includes a sophisticated auditing system that can detect intruder activity, as well as SELinux, which provides host-based intrusion prevention capabilities by confining privileged programs and user sessions which may become compromised. Install an additional intrusion detection tool to provide complementary or duplicative monitoring, reporting, and reaction capabilities to those of the base platform. For DoD systems, the McAfee Host-based Security System is provided to fulfill this role.

The intent seems to be 'layered defense,' e.g. if native capabilities break down within RHEL -- meaning someone corrupts not only the AIDE database but further somehow mitigates SELinux -- the 3rd party software (HBSS) will still hold integrity. This is laughable. If native capabilities are mitigated, the box is *owned*.

Perhaps we could lobby FSO to alter this language to ensure that a HIDS is installed, regardless of where it comes from.