I understand the changes in container practices. But I have some concerns.
For example, if we scan a container and evaluate the rule "service
chronyd must be enabled" and the service isn't enabled in the
The scanner will return the result "fail". Should we expect the user
to review and waive the results that this particular container isn't
supposed to run chronyd?
Then, there are also containerized services not managed by systemd,
but defined as container's entrypoint in Dockerfiles.
Another example are the kernel options. Should the scanner somehow
detect whether the container contains kernel modules and if not return
Or should we leave this up to the user and waiving?
If we enable the rules, how to prevent false positives? Is the way to
create tailored profiles for certain types of containers?
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 6:42 PM Gabe Alford <redhatrises(a)gmail.com> wrote:
Containers are changing from where we originally thought certain practices were going to
hold true. These ideas and practices no longer hold true.
Kernel modules are going to start to be installed, delivered, and configured through
containers (delivered by Red Hat). SSH servers are now running in containers (some
delivered by Red Hat).
Systemd is running in containers (some also delivered by Red Hat).
Security and security content is not what someone thinks should or shouldn't be in a
container. It is about ensuring the container is secured properly.
By not evaluating certain security rules, the container is considered less compliant and
more vulnerable especially with the change in what is happening to containers.
Also, what OpenSCAP can and cannot do should never be the determining factor in security
content as many other security vendors consume our content that don't have the same
limitations that OpenSCAP does.
The world has and is changing how it uses containers so that our original assumptions are
no longer valid. This (and the fact that others consume our content) is why many PRs are
reverting the machine platform.
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 10:16 AM Matej Tyc <matyc(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> Hello everybody,
> there are now numerous PRs upstream now that disable the machine platform designation
of certain rules - see
> Historically, this project uses one profile that is intended to scan both running
systems and container images. Obviously, scanning of lifeless filesystems (a.k.a offline
scanning) is limited, and the machine platform has been used to control rule applicability
to such environments (i.e. environments other than running bare-metal systems or VMs).
> This way is cheap, a bit dirty, and the following categories of rules ended up being
> Rules that are not applicable in containers, or rules that represent serious
antipatterns (e.g. kernel-related rules, partition-related rules)
> Rules that can't be checked for in offline scans due to OVAL limitations
(anything that requires the /proc filesystem)
> Rules that represent a likely antipattern (systemd in containers)
> Rules that OpenSCAP can't properly offline-scan.
> It is quite clear that in case No. 4, removal of the machine platform is the right
thing to do, although it is likely to cause problems elsewhere. However, it is at best
questionable in case 3. For example, there is a way to determine whether we are scanning a
filesystem of a systemd-powered container, and execute the check accordingly, but until
all the bits are in place, removing the platform from the rule will make the situation
worse for the majority of use cases.
> Therefore, I suggest that we reach a consensus about what to do with those PRs, as
they are making the list of open PRs difficult to navigate in.
> My proposal is to close all PRs that touch rules falling into categories 1-3, as
those PRs don't make the situation any better.
> scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org
> Fedora Code of Conduct:
> List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines
> List Archives:
scap-security-guide mailing list -- scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org
To unsubscribe send an email to scap-security-guide-leave(a)lists.fedorahosted.org
Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/
List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines