I've always thought that the week long lockouts were also silly.

15 minutes will deter pretty much anyone.

Trevor

On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 8:10 AM, Shaw, Ray V CTR USARMY ARL (US) <ray.v.shaw.ctr@mail.mil> wrote:
With the other password complexity requirements, week-long lockouts after 3 failed attempts, and changes every 60 days, the requirement is rather excessive (and asking for people to not be able to remember their password, and we know what that means).

Fortunately, we can use PKI for most things these days...except, ahem, Red Hat Satellite Server.

--Ray

-----Original Message-----
From: scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org [mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf Of Leam Hall
Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2015 8:00 PM
To: SCAP Security Guide <scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org>
Subject: Re: difok value in stig-rhel7-server-upstream profile

No kidding. I know there are smart people at DISA, but the general output seems to be from people who don't actually use computers or follow their own rules.

Leam

On 07/25/15 19:56, Trevor Vaughan wrote:
> Interesting. Not looking forward to the backlash on implementing that one.
>
> Trevor
>
> On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Shawn Wells <shawn@redhat.com
> <mailto:shawn@redhat.com>> wrote:
>
>     Unfortunately, DISA now requires that 15 of the characters differ
>     between passwords.
>
>     Ref: https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide/issues/91
>
>     Awkwardly citing the same requirement (SRG-OS-000072), of which the
>     full text is:
>
>         The operating system must require the change of at least 15 of
>         the total number of characters when passwords are changed.
>
>         If the operating system allows the user to consecutively reuse
>         extensive portions of passwords, this increases the chances of
>         password compromise by increasing the window of opportunity for
>         attempts at guessing and brute-force attacks.
>
>         The number of changed characters refers to the number of changes
>         required with respect to the total number of positions in the
>         current password. In other words, characters may be the same
>         within the two passwords; however, the positions of the like
>         characters must be different.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>     On 7/24/15 2:44 PM, Arnold, Paul C CTR USARMY PEO STRI (US) wrote:
>
>         The DoD states 50% of the minimum password length, which rounds
>         up to 8 and coincides with OS-SRG v1r2 (SRG-OS-000072). The SSG
>         also applies to systems outside the DoD, which may dictate some
>         initial/default rules.
>
>         However, 15 seems to be too high for a default parameter.
>
>         Regards,
>         --
>         Paul C. Arnold
>         IT Systems Engineer
>         Cole Engineering Services, Inc.
>
>         ________________________________________
>         From: scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org
>         <mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org>
>         [scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org
>         <mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org>] on
>         behalf of Shaw, Ray V CTR USARMY ARL (US)
>         [ray.v.shaw.ctr@mail.mil <mailto:ray.v.shaw.ctr@mail.mil>]
>         Sent: Friday, July 24, 2015 02:30 PM
>         To: scap-security-guide
>         ‎[scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org
>         <mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org>]‎
>         Subject: difok value in stig-rhel7-server-upstream profile
>
>         RHEL/7/input/profiles/stig-rhel7-server-upstream.xml has the
>         following:
>
>         <refine-value idref="var_password_pam_difok" selector="15" />
>
>         Should this be changed from 15 to 4?  The help text indicates
>         that the DoD requirement is 4, and other documentation seems to
>         support this.
>
>         --
>         Ray Shaw (Contractor, STG)
>         Army Research Laboratory
>         CISD, Unix Support
>         --
>         SCAP Security Guide mailing list
>         scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org
>         <mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org>
>         https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide
>         https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide/
>
>
>     --
>     Shawn Wells
>     Director, Innovation Programs
>     shawn@redhat.com <mailto:shawn@redhat.com> | 443.534.0130
>     <tel:443.534.0130>
>     @shawndwells
>
>     --
>     SCAP Security Guide mailing list
>     scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org
>     <mailto:scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org>
>     https://lists.fedorahosted.org/mailman/listinfo/scap-security-guide
>     https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide/
>
>
>
>
> --
> Trevor Vaughan
> Vice President, Onyx Point, Inc



--
Trevor Vaughan
Vice President, Onyx Point, Inc
(410) 541-6699

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