It's completely technology agnostic and has a focus on containers instead
of container ecosystems. As far as I know, the RH stack has the ability to
do everything contained within it and I *think* that SCAP may be able to
validate the majority of the items if implemented in accordingly.
Overall, I think this is where OSCAL is going to come into play. We need to
be able to ship building blocks of compliance information along to users
that can be plugged together to present a full-scope picture.
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 12:41 PM Gabe Alford <redhatrises(a)gmail.com> wrote:
Containers are changing from where we originally thought certain
were going to hold true. These ideas and practices no longer hold true.
Kernel modules are going to start to be installed, delivered, and
configured through containers (delivered by Red Hat). SSH servers are now
running in containers (some delivered by Red Hat).
Systemd is running in containers (some also delivered by Red Hat).
Security and security content is not what someone thinks should or
shouldn't be in a container. It is about ensuring the container is secured
By not evaluating certain security rules, the container is considered less
compliant and more vulnerable especially with the change in what is
happening to containers.
Also, what OpenSCAP can and cannot do should never be the determining
factor in security content as many other security vendors consume our
content that don't have the same limitations that OpenSCAP does.
The world has and is changing how it uses containers so that our original
assumptions are no longer valid. This (and the fact that others consume our
content) is why many PRs are reverting the machine platform.
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 10:16 AM Matej Tyc <matyc(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> Hello everybody,
> there are now numerous PRs upstream now that disable the machine platform
> designation of certain rules - see
> Historically, this project uses one profile that is intended to scan both
> running systems and container images. Obviously, scanning of lifeless
> filesystems (a.k.a offline scanning) is limited, and the machine platform
> has been used to control rule applicability to such environments (i.e.
> environments other than running bare-metal systems or VMs).
> This way is cheap, a bit dirty, and the following categories of rules
> ended up being machine-only:
> 1. Rules that are not applicable in containers, or rules that
> represent serious antipatterns (e.g. kernel-related rules,
> partition-related rules)
> 2. Rules that can't be checked for in offline scans due to OVAL
> limitations (anything that requires the /proc filesystem)
> 3. Rules that represent a likely antipattern (systemd in containers)
> 4. Rules that OpenSCAP can't properly offline-scan.
> It is quite clear that in case No. 4, removal of the machine platform is
> the right thing to do, although it is likely to cause problems elsewhere.
> However, it is at best questionable in case 3. For example, there is a way
> to determine whether we are scanning a filesystem of a systemd-powered
> container, and execute the check accordingly, but until all the bits are in
> place, removing the platform from the rule will make the situation worse
> for the majority of use cases.
> Therefore, I suggest that we reach a consensus about what to do with
> those PRs, as they are making the list of open PRs difficult to navigate in.
> My proposal is to close all PRs that touch rules falling into categories
> 1-3, as those PRs don't make the situation any better.
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