Thanks for the explanation Shawn!

+1 Trey. The more baked starting points SSG offers the better. 

You are giving me some ideas, Mt Smith. 

Greg Elin
P: 917-304-3488
E:  gregelin@gitmachines.com

Sent from my iPhone

On Sep 16, 2014, at 9:01 AM, David Smith <dsmith@secure-innovations.net> wrote:

Fortunately, NIST provides 800-53 Rev 4 in XML form to allow for just that kind of wizardry.

On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 8:58 AM, Trey Henefield <trey.henefield@ultra-ats.com> wrote:


That is a great breakdown Shawn!

I think it would it be useful to create profiles that align with the RMF IA control baselines (low, moderate, high) and also include profiles that build upon the IA control baseline profiles to additionally support the current 5 overlays (CNSSI No. 1253).

Best regards,


Trey Henefield, CISSP
Senior IAVA Engineer

Ultra Electronics
Advanced Tactical Systems, Inc.
4101 Smith School Road
Building IV, Suite 100
Austin, TX 78744 USA

Trey.Henefield@ultra-ats.com
Tel: +1 512 327 6795 ext. 647
Fax: +1 512 327 8043
Mobile: +1 512 541 6450

www.ultra-ats.com


-----Original Message-----
From: scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org [mailto:scap-security-guide-bounces@lists.fedorahosted.org] On Behalf Of Shawn Wells
Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 6:26 AM
To: scap-security-guide@lists.fedorahosted.org
Subject: Re: DIACAP vs DIARMF & STIGs & CCEs.

On 9/15/14, 5:02 PM, Greg Elin wrote:
> I was wondering if anyone was available to explain DIACAP transition
> to DIARMF and what it means for STIGS and SSG?
>
> Happy to have a public email thread, but also happy to take it offline.
>
> Here is my summary understanding.
>
> DoD developed its own list of information assurance controls under
> DIACAP (DoD Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation
> Process).
>
> In recent years (2010-2012), the DIACAP started transitioning to
> DIARMF (DoD Information Assurance Risk Management Framework) to align
> it with NIST RMF, and to bring the catalog of controls into alignment
> with the controls listed in 800-53, with some special overlays
> available for Defense-related systems.
>
> As of Spring 2014, that transition is complete.
>
> But I'm trying to make sure I understand how the STIGs play into all
> of this. When I look at the STIGs, I see different control number
> tracking than from the 800-53s or the CCEs.
>
> Is it the case that the Control catalog is now 800-53r4 for both
> civilian and DoD, but DoD is using STIGs to get to platform specific
> details while civilian side is using CCEs?
>
> If there were just 5 or 6 documents about current/active control
> catalogs, what would they be? 800-137, 800-53, 8510.1 and/or ... ???
>
> Thanks...

The various RMF implementations call out NIST 800-53 as the place to derive implementation requirements.

When DoD (via DISA FSO) goes through NIST 800-53 and pulls out things they care about, they call it a STIG.
When Civilian (via NIST) goes through, the output is called USGCB.

NIST 800-53 has some high-level framework control, e.g. "ABC-1," could say something along "Do secure passwords, using [agency defined] values for length and complexity."

DISA FSO then takes that requirement defines it further into "Control Correlation Identifiers":
CCI-12345 Passwords must be 12 characters
CCI-12346 Passwords must contain 2 upper case
CCI-12347 Passwords must contain 2 special chars

DISA has an entire spreadsheet of these CCI controls per product category -- they call these the Security Requirements Guide (SRG). The one RHEL must follow is the operating System SRG, and you can find the underlying RHEL7 STIG requirements here:
http://people.redhat.com/swells/RHEL7_STIG_REQUIREMENTS.xlsx

When a vendor such as Red Hat creates implementation guidance -- exactly what variable to change in some specific file -- that is mapped to a Configuration Control Enumerator (CCE).



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