I'm hoping you can help put me out of my misery!
I've taken the latest version of scap-security-guide
# git clone https://git.fedorahosted.org/git/scap-security-guide.git
And I've been trying to run "make content; make validate" on the RHEL/6
... if I do a fresh git clone and run it, it is successful and the validate
...if i first go into the RHEL/6/input/checks/templates directory and run
"make templates; make copy" ....and then run the "make content; make
validate" it fails:
paul@myhost:/tmp/ssg3/scap-security-guide/RHEL/6> make validate
oscap xccdf validate-xml output/ssg-rhel6-xccdf.xml
oscap oval validate-xml output/ssg-rhel6-oval.xml
oscap oval validate-xml output/ssg-rhel6-cpe-oval.xml
cd output; ../utils/verify-references.py --rules-with-invalid-checks
OVAL Check is not referenced by XCCDF: oval:ssg:def:556
make: *** [validate] Error 1
...this is a bug of some kind right?
Also in the vein of automation, went ahead and installed an instance of
Jenkins and connected it to SSG:
Not meant to be permanent right now, but wanted to get something stood
up for us to play with. Martin stood one up for the OpenSCAP
interpreter, which was the source of thinking to stand up a sandbox for
SSG too. There really isn't much to see in the UI, but one thing it does
is integrate into GitHub. Whenever someone issues a pull request,
Jenkins will automagically detect that, apply the patch(s), and run
Check out https://github.com/OpenSCAP/scap-security-guide/pull/45 for an
example. Or for the lazy :-), see below:
When you click on Details, you're brought to an overview of the patch
and can even see console output of the build (in case there were errors):
Having this in place should afford the peer reviewers an immediate
answer to "does this validate?" Longer term, this could also enable unit
checks of the OVAL and bash scripts.
Does anyone have experience with Jenkins, thoughts on how we could
begin building out unit tests, or really any thoughts on usefulness
beyond "make validate" on pull requests?
I just wanted to know if it was on purpose that the xccdf rules
"httpd_servertokens_prod" and "httpd_serversignature_off" have no OVAL
I suppose it has something to do with the difficulty to write the most
valid test. Considering that just testing for ServerToken and signature in
httpd.conf might not be enough to guarantee that the setting is enabled.
Thanks in advance for your feedback.
You indicated that the .rule files are available as part of SSG? Can you
please remind me where these are located?
http://govready.org - Making FISMA compliance easier for innovators
as you may know I have been working on a complete rewrite of HTML report and guide for the upcoming openscap 1.1.0 release. It's a feature that will touch almost every user of openscap. I would like to gather feedback from the scap-security-guide community so that we can make sure there aren't any blocker issues in the release. It is natural that there will be small issues that we will iron out in minor releases. Basically we would just like to make sure the new report and guide aren't missing anything crucial that would prevent adoption.
See https://mpreisle.fedorapeople.org/openscap/1.1.0_xslt/ for sample HTML report and guide from SSG for RHEL6.
Looking forward to feedback.
On Fri, Aug 29, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Martin Preisler <mpreisle(a)redhat.com>
> ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Andrew Gilmore" <agilmore2(a)gmail.com>
> > To: "SCAP Security Guide" <scap-security-guide(a)lists.fedorahosted.org>
> > Sent: Thursday, August 28, 2014 8:29:48 PM
> > Subject: Re: New report and guide in openscap 1.1.0
> > I like the new look and functionality.
> > Two first blush comments:
> > 1) On the report document, I can imagine my security officials freaking
> > over the in-your-face "*The system is not compliant!*" text. What is the
> > recommended course to ensure this text does not appear if you're running
> > the scan on a webserver, for example? Is it as simple as creating a
> > profile derived from the STIG profile? Does anyone directly use the STIG
> > profile, have a completely compliant system, and have a server that
> > actually does anything useful?
> > Up to now, I've left tests in that I have waivers for, and then pointed
> > the waivers to justify the test failures. Perhaps I will need to change
> > that practice.
> Isn't that a good thing? They should freak out, their system is not
> The recommended course is to tailor the profile, leaving out rules that
> no sense on your system. Then you fix the remaining rules using
> In the end the machine will be compliant.
I would maybe add or modify the message here to be something along the
- "The system is not compliant! Please review rule results, site/network
security requirements, and consider applying remediation."
--- or ---
- "The system may not be compliant! Please review rule results,
site/network security requirements, and consider applying remediation."
I personally would prefer the last one as it says, "Hey. Check your system
as well as check your security requirements to see if what you are seeing
from the scan matches with those security requirements."
The job of openscap is to check your machines for compliance over and over.
> When the machines are suddenly not compliant you really want to know that!
> > 2) On the guide document, the text beginning "Providing system
> > administrators" occurs twice.
> Looks like an issue with SSG but I will look more into it.
> Martin Preisler
> SCAP Security Guide mailing list