On 08.08.19 21:55, Björn Persson wrote:
· Minisign itself: Precompiled binary packages are signed, but not
the
source code apparently.
https://github.com/jedisct1/minisign/issues/61
· Sodium: There are both Minisign signatures and OpenPGP signatures.
· dnscrypt-proxy: Again, precompiled binary packages are signed, but
not the source code.
· Radare2: I can't find any signatures.
· OpenSMTPD: Signify signatures found.
I can create issues/PRs for these one later as well!
As for packages requiring gnupg2, there are slightly more... But there
may be some false positives as well...
$ repoquery -q --disablerepo='*' --enablerepo=fedora-source
--enablerepo=updates-source --archlist=src --whatrequires gnupg2
--releasever=rawhide | wc
83 83 2468
That's great and all, but have there been any serious attempts to
trick
Minisign or Signify into accepting a fake signature, by people who are
experienced in such attacks?
Not that I know of. The author is Minisign is the author of libsodium as
well. So the trust is mostly based on the author's reputation, and the
reputation of OpenBSD developers (signify). I did find an audit by PIA
from two years ago for libsodium that was quite positive [1].
Cryptography is tricky stuff. It's very easy to overlook some
detail.
Users should be wary of homegrown protocols that haven't been rigorously
analyzed.
As for the current status quo, i.e. PGP, see [2,3], it would be fair to
hold PGP (GnuPG) to the same standards... Based on its history of
vulnerabilities I don't really trust it for anything. I'm sure you can
use it safely if you are an expert and don't use key servers, but well,
I don't trust myself with PGP... That is also the main reason I am in
the process of switching to signify/Minisign for my own projects.
Cheers,
François
[1]
https://www.privateinternetaccess.com/blog/2017/08/libsodium-v1-0-12-and-...
[2]
https://latacora.micro.blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem.html
[3]
https://blog.trailofbits.com/2019/07/08/fuck-rsa/