On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 5:54 AM Justin Forbes <jforbes(a)redhat.com> wrote:
No, nothing has changed here, loading a proprietary module has marked the kernel as
tainted for a very long time. If you went back to 2.6 kernels, you would see a similar
message about the kernel being tainted. The message has expanded a bit over the years as
we check for things like module signatures, etc, but the end result is the same the taint
flag is P for proprietary module.
Unless the user has gone to the trouble of self signing a proprietary
module, and adding that key to the keyring, UEFI secure boot had to be disabled to even
load the module. Module signatures are used and checked outside of secure boot as well.
Still, even if they do sign the module and add that key to enable the module to work with
secure boot, the kernel will be tainted P.
Is it technically possible for the Fedora signing key to be used to
sign a 3rd party key, thereby allowing the loading of 3rd party
modules signed with that 3rd party key?
Policy wise, is it likely that could be done? e.g. trusting the RPM
Fusion Nvidia and Broadcom kernel modules?
On the one hand Fedora is supporting UEFI Secure Boot out of the box,
ostensibly we want users to leave it enabled. But because self-signing
modules is tedious, possibly quite a lot of users are just disabling
UEFI Secure Boot. I'm not sure if it's possible to make this work out
of the box for users, but it would be nice to not just make it a