El mar., 2 jul. 2019 a las 18:48, Kevin Fenzi (<kevin@scrye.com>) escribió:
Hey everyone,

As some of you may have read:


or other media reports about vulnerabilities of the current gpg
keyserver software/network/policy.

TLDR: Someone can (and has been) flooding sks keyservers with poisoned
certs. Users that download from sks keyservers may well find gpg just
stops working, hangs, or breaks in terrible ways. The SKS software is no
longer maintained and because the policy is 'never delete anything'
there's likely no way to mitigate the attacks.

I've cc'ed nb here for his take on things, but as I read it, it might be
best to just retire the keys.fedoraproject.org service at least for now
to avoid breaking users or telling them we have a service they should
trust when they really... should not.



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Hello Kevin,
I agree with you about shutting down `keys.fedoraproject.org`. Seems SKS (the software used by the keyservers)
will be not safe to use until someone (smart and who code OCaml and who understands the algorithm) can address this problem.

As it says here: https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f#mitigations
"... At present I (speaking only for myself) do not believe the global keyserver network is salvageable. High-risk users should stop using the keyserver network immediately...."

So +1 to turn it off.

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