First of all. FreeIPA servers should be one of the best guarded servers in any infrastructure. In addition to service private keys they contain the private key to the internal CA certificate, the kerberos database (user password hashes) etc. It is a very bad idea to run other non-related services on these hosts.

As far as I understand, the services under "Services" are mostly kerberos service principals. I haven't seen any standard list as to what a service name can be. So basically you can configure whateveryouwant/my-host. There are several standard service names (HTTP, cifs, nfs etc.) and the respective clients to these services know to query these. For example your web browser will go and make a request for HTTP/my_host@MY_REALM service ticket when you navigate to https://my_host and it has "Negotiate" authentication configured. This allows you to authenticate to that web service based on your logon credentials (kerberos ticket (no password)).

Kontakt lejeczek via FreeIPA-users (<freeipa-users@lists.fedorahosted.org>) kirjutas kuupäeval K, 9. veebruar 2022 kell 09:43:
On 08/02/2022 19:33, Ahti Seier via FreeIPA-users wrote:
> Hello,
>
>   I don't think there is one correct answer to this question. It
> depends on the services and how those hosts and services are managed.
>
>   From a security perspective you need to have confidence that your
> private keys are secure and have not been been compromised. So if the
> services are administered by different teams or people it is better to
> separate the keys and control access to them  so that each team and
> service would have access only to their own keys. Meaning it is better
> to have a certificate for each service. This will not save you if one
> of the keys gets compromised, but it is better to figure out how it
> happened and who is responsible if/when it does. It is a good idea if
> these certificates are with a different subject name because when one
> is expiring or there is some issue with it it is easier to understand
> which one it is. The OU field in the subject DN is a good way to
> separate these.
>
>   If the server and all its services are managed by a single
> team/person and the impact of key compromise is not that severe then
> having one certificate for multiple services can be simpler to manage.
> All services will have access to the same private key. This has the
> effect that when a key does get compromised you will have a hard time
> figuring out how or through which service it could have happened.
>
> Just my 2c,
> Ahti
>
okey, so another one obvious - how about masters themselves? (put the
recommendation that IPA boxes should be IPA exclusive aside for now)

I assume most of us if did not do then at least were tempted to have
databases (other than IPA's) on masters - if you do/did that would you
then use master's or separate/dedicated cert? (risks possibilities are
what they are but I'm still curious to hear opinions & thoughts)

and btw. Is there a defined list of - IPA's or greater standard -
approved/supported services or we create those at whim as we go? eg.
mysql/my-host posgresql/my-host .etc

many thanks, L.

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