On Mon, 2012-06-25 at 14:10 -0400, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 1:56 PM, Peter Jones
<pjones(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> I feel like this is quite patronizing. We've stated time and again that we
> don't believe the scenario you're preaching has any real /viability/, and
Sounds like you're not arguing with me, you're arguing with Canonical.
That's disingenuous. You were the one that brought it up here, it's
entirely fair to respond to you.
I didn't propose this, the only stuff I proposed fit within the
invariants you set out: That the rules of the game required you to
restrict the system thusly if Fedora was to boot at all.
The constraint is not "to boot at all", it's "to boot without needing
to
reconfigure SB".
And as a result it appears that they have a plan
which will make a better stand for software freedom while
simultaneously satisfying the PR interest of "not capitulating to
Microsoft", for whatever value that has.
Calculon: And you say you can guarantee me an Oscar?
Bender: I can guarantee you anything you want!
> so we've chosen not to propose it. There's no secret
here - it's possible
> to do, but we don't think it'd last very long before our keys are
I'm looking for a message where anyone said "we could do this, but we
expect our keys would eventually be blacklisted" can you help me out?
I really feel you're being intentionally dense. Revocation of the
ability to execute known malware vectors is the entire point of the
Secure Boot exercise. If the signing authority wasn't willing to issue
revocations, they'd be failing at their own stated goal.
- ajax