On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 11:26:50AM -0300, Horst H. von Brand wrote:
Matthew Garrett <mjg59(a)srcf.ucam.org> wrote:
[...]
> To a first approximation, simply auditing the distribution for anything
> that opens files or reads information from the network and forbidding
> them ptrace access (and denying ptrace access from any existing confined
> domains except, maybe, staff_t) seems like it would get us most of the
> way to option 4 without breaking existing user expectations. What am I
> missing that makes this infeasible?
That would leave just "Hello, world!" style programs (as long as they
aren't in some way localized, like the GNU version is).
Yeah, that's a bit broad. The 99% case would probably be anything that
reads from the network or opens PDFs or doc files.
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59(a)srcf.ucam.org