Am 30.10.2013 11:27, schrieb Alec Leamas:
On 2013-10-30 11:23, Reindl Harald wrote:
> Am 30.10.2013 11:20, schrieb Alec Leamas:
>> On 2013-10-30 10:58, Reindl Harald wrote:
>>> Am 30.10.2013 10:53, schrieb Alec Leamas:
>>>> On 2013-10-30 10:23, Reindl Harald wrote:
>>>>> Am 30.10.2013 02:03, schrieb Chris Adams:
>>>>>> Once upon a time, Reindl Harald <h.reindl(a)thelounge.net>
said:
>>>>>>> [root@srv-rhsoft:~]$ mkdir test
>>>>>>> i could rm -rf ~/ here
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [root@srv-rhsoft:~]$ cat /usr/local/bin/mkdir
>>>>>>> #!/bin/bash
>>>>>>> echo "i could rm -rf ~/ here"
>>>>>> If I can write to files you own, it doesn't matter if
there's a
>>>>>> directory in the PATH or not. I can write this to your
.bash_profile:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> /bin/mkdir $HOME/.bin 2> /dev/null
>>>>>> echo 'echo "i could rm -rf ~/ here"' >
$HOME/.bin/mkdir
>>>>>> chmod +x $HOME/.bin/mkdir
>>>>>> PATH=$HOME/.bin:$PATH
>>>>> you can do this and that - but that's no valid argumentation
>>>>> doing bad things in default setups and *at least* do not
>>>>> place *hidden* diretories there, ther is a good reason why
>>>>> software like rkhunter alerts if you have hidden directories
>>>>> somewhere in /usr/bin/
>>>>>
>>>> Some kind of reference for the bad in having a well-known, hidden
directory in the path?
>>> the *writeable for the user* is the problem
>> Any reference for this problem?
> what about consider the implications?
> do you really need a written reference for any security relevant fact?
> i can write one for you if you prefer links :-)
>
Well, the question is really if someone else out there share your concerns about this
anybody with interests in security
https://www.google.at/search?q=ssh+chroot+why+needs+the+home+directory+to...
http://binblog.info/2008/04/06/openssh-chrooted-sftp-eg-for-webhosting/
However, the chroot destination must not be owned by the user for security reasons