Adam Williamson píše v Po 01. 11. 2010 v 10:55 -0700:
On Mon, 2010-11-01 at 18:51 +0100, Miloslav Trmač wrote:
> > Sorry, but characterizing it as a 'known problem' is misleading.
> > easy to forecast failure, and you'll likely always be correct in *some*
> > cases if you forecast enough failures. Only if you precisely forecast
> > only the failures that actually happen, and do not forecast any failures
> > that don't happen, can your forecast be considered truly reliable.
> The accuracy of prediction, and especially accuracy of the timing, is
> not at all relevant. In fact, it is _preciselly_ the unknown nature of
> risks that requires thinking about them in advance.
Which rather contradicts your description of it as a 'known problem',
No; the existence of the problem was known, only the timing and precise
extent was not.
If you want to continue with the analogy, what you seem to be saying
that we should never have implemented the policy in the first place,
That is one
option; another would be adding a "I'm the maintainer and I
really mean it" checkbox for security updates (with FESCo/Fedora
QA/somebody else reviewing the cases retrospectively, if they feel like
it); yeat another is not enforcing the policy on security updates at
all, as I seem to remember was proposed (or even implemented?) at one